The medium tactical vehicle replacement program-an analysis of a multi-service office by Schramm, Kenneth Edward
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-06
The medium tactical vehicle replacement
program-an analysis of a multi-service office
Schramm, Kenneth Edward














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT 
PROGRAM-AN ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-SERVICE ARMY 








 Thesis Advisor:   Brad R. Naegle 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, 
including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining 
the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding 
this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
Program-An Analysis of a Multi-Service Army and Marine Corps Product 
Office 
6. AUTHOR(S)   Kenneth Schramm 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY REPORT 
NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not reflect 
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
 
The Marine Corps is fielding the MTVR Truck as a replacement for its aging fleet of five-ton cargo trucks.  
The MTVR is an Acquisition Category II program that was a multi-service Army-Marine Corps program.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of having an Army Product Office execute a Marine Corps 
Program.  The study analyzes the effectiveness of the timing of the program’s transition from the Army to the 
Marine Corps.  A detailed literature search, as well as information gathered from attending various IPRs and 
conducting interviews with program officials and contractors, provided the basis for the in-depth background study 
presented.  Analysis of the data gathered led to a justification for multi-service managed programs, as well as to 
recommendations on the timing of the MTVR program transition. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
262 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  MTVR Truck, Acquisition Category II, ACAT, Marine Corp’s Medium 
Tactical Vehicle Replacement, High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle, HMMWV, 
Logistics Vehicle System, LVS, Light Armored Vehicle, LAV  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500  Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT PROGRAM-AN 
ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-SERVICE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS PRODUCT 
OFFICE 
 
Kenneth E. Schramm 
Program Analyst, United States Army 
B.B.A., University of Michigan, 1977 
MBA, University of Detroit, 1986 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 












Author:  Kenneth E. Schramm 
 
 
Approved by:  Brad R. Naegle 
   Thesis Advisor 
 
 
   Michael W. Boudreau 
   Second Reader 
 
 
   Douglas A. Brook, Dean 





























The Marine Corps is fielding the MTVR Truck as a replacement for its 
aging fleet of five-ton cargo trucks.  The MTVR is an Acquisition Category II 
program that was a multi-service Army-Marine Corps program.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of having an Army Product Office 
execute a Marine Corps Program.  The study analyzes the effectiveness of the 
timing of the program’s transition from the Army to the Marine Corps.  A detailed 
literature search, as well as information gathered from attending various IPRs 
and conducting interviews with program officials and contractors, provided the 
basis for the in-depth background study presented.  Analysis of the data 
gathered led to a justification for multi-service managed programs, as well as to 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. PURPOSE............................................................................................ 1 
B. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................... 3 
1. Primary Research Question.................................................... 3 
2. Supplemental Research Questions........................................ 3 
D. SCOPE................................................................................................. 3 
E. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 3 
F. ORGANIZATION.................................................................................. 4 
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH................................................................. 4 
II. BACKGROUND.............................................................................................. 7 
A. HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF U.S. 
MARINE CORPS TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES......................... 7 
1. Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) ............................................. 7 
2. Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) .................................................. 9 
B.   ARMY’S FMTV- IMPACT ON THE MTVR ......................................... 10 
1.   FMTV Program Background ................................................. 10 
2.   Corrosion Standards ............................................................. 11 
C.  MEDIUM TACTICAL REPLACEMENT VEHICLE (MTVR) 
PROGRAM......................................................................................... 12 
1. Program Goals ....................................................................... 12 
2. MTVR Operational and System Description ........................ 13 
3. Marine Corps Advanced Technology Demonstration and 
Acquisition Streamlining....................................................... 15 
4. Industry Involvement/IPTs .................................................... 17 
5.   USMC Selection of Army Program Management ................ 19 
6.   USMC/Army Combined Medium Tactical Truck 
Remanufacture (MTTR) EMD Prototype Testing and 
Contract Strategies................................................................ 19 
7. LRIP and Production Testing................................................ 21 
D. MTVR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT........................ 25 
1. Army Product Management Office ....................................... 25 
a. PM Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Remanufacture 
Programs ..................................................................... 25 
b. Reassigned to PM Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicles (FMTV) .......................................................... 25 
c. Reassigned as Direct Reporting Product Manager 
to PEO Ground Combat and Support Systems 
(GCSS) ......................................................................... 26 
d. Reassigned to PM Ground Support Integration ....... 27 
 viii
e. PM-MTVR Awards and Recognition .......................... 28 
2. TACOM Matrix Support Organizations ................................ 29 
a. Acquisition Center ...................................................... 29 
b. The Integrated Material Management Center 
(IMMC) .......................................................................... 30 
c. Safety Office ................................................................ 30 
d. TACOM Security Assistance Center (TSAC) ............ 30 
3. USMC Acquisition Organizations......................................... 31 
a. MARCORSYSCOM ...................................................... 31 
b.  USMC Acquisition Center-Quantico, VA ................... 32 
4. Future Cooperative Acquisition Efforts............................... 32 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY....................................................................... 34 
III. ARMY/MARINE CORPS MULTI-SERVICE TWV ACQUISITION 
MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................ 37 
A. MTVR TRANSITION FROM ARMY TO USMC: THE PLAN.............. 37 
1. Rationale................................................................................. 37 
2. Goals and Challenges ........................................................... 37 
3.   Schedule................................................................................. 38 
4. Analysis of the Transition..................................................... 44 
5.  Transition Advantages .......................................................... 46 
6. Transition Challenges ........................................................... 47 
B. USMC PERSPECTIVE....................................................................... 49 
1. MARCORSYSCOM Project Officer Interviews..................... 49 
a. Major Lee Morton, USMC Project Officer for MTVR 
from December 1999 to October 2002....................... 49 
b. Mr. Dennis Haag, USMC Liaison Officer to 
USATACOM from June 1993 to August 1997, 
Science Applications International Corporation 
MTVR Contractor August 1997 to May 2000 ............. 51 
2. Marine Corps Viewpoint ........................................................ 52 
C.  U.S.  ARMY PERSPECTIVE.............................................................. 53 
1. Army Product Manager Interviews....................................... 53 
a. LTC George Schneller, Product Manager for the 
MTVR from September 1996 to July 1999 ................. 53 
b. LTC Walt Raymond, Product Manager for the 
MTVR from July 1999 to June 2001 ........................... 54 
2. Collective Viewpoint of Army Personnel ............................. 57 
D. OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION PERSPECTIVE...................... 58 
1.  Mr. Steve Zinke, MTVR Program Director Interview at 
OTC ......................................................................................... 58 
2. Summary of Interviews ......................................................... 59 
E. PROGRAM TRANSITION QUESTIONNAIRE ................................... 60 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY....................................................................... 63 
IV.  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 65 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ..................................... 65 
 ix
1. Subsidiary Research Questions........................................... 65 
B.  THESIS CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 66 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................... 67 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ................................................. 67 
APPENDIX A. HISTORY OF TACOM............................................................. 69 
A. TACOM TRUCK DEVELOPMENTS .................................................. 73 
APPENDIX B. HISTORY OF OSHKOSH TRUCK COMPANY....................... 79 
A. OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION PERSPECTIVE...................... 83 
APPENDIX C. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS-QUANTICO.......................... 87 
APPENDIX D. COLLABORATION DECISION PAPER/POINT PAPER ........ 91 
APPENDIX E. MTVR ANALYSIS ................................................................. 123 
APPENDIX F. MTVR TRANSITION PLAN FROM U.S. ARMY, TACOM TO 
MARINE CORPS, QUANTICO ................................................................... 147 
APPENDIX G. MTVR PROGRAM TRANSITION BRIEFING TO 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MARCORSYSCOM............................................ 171 
APPENDIX H. USMC MARCORSYSCOM ORGANIZATION CHART ......... 207 
APPENDIX I. US ARMY PEO-GCSS ORGANIZATION CHARTS.............. 215 
APPENDIX J. MTVR PHOTO COLLECTION............................................... 217 
APPENDIX K. MTRV PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE .................................. 227 
LIST OF REFERENCES........................................................................................ 229 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 233 

































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xi




AAO Approved Acquisition Objective 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACV Armored Combat Vehicle 
AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle 
AGS Armored Gun System 
AMARC Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee 
AMC Army Material Command 
AMCCOM Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command 
AMG AM General 
ANS American National Standards 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
Ao Operational Availability 
APM Assistant Program/Project/Product Manager 
APG Aberdeen Proving Grounds 
APB Acquisition Program Baseline 
ARC Aviation Refueling Capability 
ARDEC Armament Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center 
ARG Armed Reconnaissance Group  
ASARC Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
ASM Armored Systems Modernization 
AT&L Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
ASN(RDA) Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition 
ATAC U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Center 
 
BG Brigadier General 
BPR Business Process Reengineering 
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 
BSA Bachelor of Science in Administration 
 
CARC Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 
CE Concept Exploration 
CTIS Central Tire Inflation System 
CLAWS Complementary Low-Altitude Weapons System 
CLS Contractor Logistics Support 
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
COI Critical Operational Issue 
COL Colonel 
COMMARCORSYSCOM Commander, Marine Corps System Command 
 xii
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CPC Corrosion Prevention & Control 
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement 
CS&CSS  Combat Support & Combat Service Support  
CSLE Combat Support and Logistics Equipment 
CSLE(MT) Combat Support and Logistics Equipment (Motor 
Transport) 
CTIS Central Tire Inflation System 
CTQ Critical to Quality 
 
DA Department of the Army 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DAES Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
DARCOM Development and Readiness Command 
DCMC Defense Contract Management Command 
DEW Distant Early Warning 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoE Department of Energy 
DoN Department of the Navy 
DoT Department of Transportation 
DPM Deputy Program/Project/Product Manager 
DSA Deputy for System Acquisition 
DSMC Defense Systems Management College 
DT Developmental Testing 
DTP Detailed Test Plan 
 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
EMD Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
EOA Early Operational Assessment 
EPA Economic Price Adjustment 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ESH Environmental, Safety and Health 
ESP Extended Service Program 
EUL Economic Useful Life 
 
FAT First Article Test 
FCS Future Combat Systems 
FFP Firm Fixed Price 
5TTR Five-Ton Truck Remanufacture 
FMF Fleet Marine Forces 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
 xiii
FOT&E Follow-On Operational Test & Evaluation 
FUE First Unit Equipped 
FUED First Unit Equipped Date 
FY Fiscal Year 
 
GAO Government Accounting Office 
GCSS Ground Combat and Support Systems 
GSI Ground Systems Integration 
 
HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 
HET Heavy Equipment Transporter 
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
HMMWVA2 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle A2 
HTI Horizontal Technology Integration 
HP Horsepower 
HSV High Speed Vessel 
HTV Heavy Tactical Vehicle 
 
IAV Interim Armored Vehicle 
ICA Independent Cost Analysis 
IETM Integrated Electronic Technical Manual 
IFAV Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 
IFV Interim Fighting Vehicle 
IHD/NSWC Indian Head Division, Naval Surface Warfare 
Center 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support 
ILSP Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
IMMC Integrated Material Management Center 
IETM Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IOT&E Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
IPA Integrated Program Assessment 
IPR In-Process Reviews 
IPT Integrated Product Team/ Initial Production 
Testing 
IPS Integrated Program Summary 
ISO International Standards Organization  
ITV Internally Transportable Vehicle 
 
J&A Justification and Approval 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System 
JSOR Joint Services Operating Requirement 
 
 xiv
LAV Light Armored Vehicle 
LAW Light Assault Weapon 
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LMTV Light Medium Tactical Vehicle 
LRIP Low-Rate Initial Production 
LTC Lieutenant Colonel 
LVS Logistics Vehicle System 
LVSR Logistics Vehicle System Replacement 
 
MAA Mission Area Analysis 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command 
MBA Master of Business Administration 
MCATTD Marine Corps’ Advanced Technology Transition 
Demonstrator 
MCB Marine Corps Base 
MCCDC Marine Corps’ Combat Development Center 
MCLB Marine Corps Logistics Base 
MCOTEA Marine Corps Test and Evaluation Activity 
MCSSS Marine Corps Service Support School 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Forces 
MEFFV Marine Corps Expeditionary Family of Fighting 
Vehicles 
MENS Mission Element Need Statement 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MHET Medium Heavy Equipment Trailer 
MIL Military 
MILMO Military Motorcycles 
MIPR Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request 
MMBOMF Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failures 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOCOM Mobility Command 
MPH Miles Per Hour 
MR Material Release 
MROC Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council 
MS Mile Stone 
M&S Modeling & Simulation 
MT Motor Transport 
MTTR Medium Tactical Truck Remanufacture 
MTV Medium Tactical Vehicle 
MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
MWTC Mountain Warfare Training Center 
 
 xv
NAC National Automotive Center 
NAE Navy Acquisition Executive 
NATC Nevada Automotive Test Center 
NEPA National Environment Protection Agency 
NDI Non-Developmental Item 
NLT Not Later Then 
NSIAD National Security and International Affairs Division 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center 
 
OA Operational Assessment 
OCO Office, Chief of Ordnance 
OCO-D Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit 
ODS Operator Driving Simulator 
OE Operational Effectiveness 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacture 
OMF Operational Mission Failure 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OTAC Ordnance Tank-Automotive Center 
OS Operational Suitability 
O&S Operations and Support 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OT Operation Test 
OTC Oshkosh Truck Corporation 
OTPO Operational Test Project Officer 
 
PCO Procurement Contracting Officer 
PDRR Program Definition & Risk Reduction 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PEO-GCSS Program Executive Office-Ground Combat and 
Support Systems 
PET Producibility Evaluation Task 
PLE Product Line Executive 
PLS Palletized Load System 
PM Program/Project/Product Manager 
PMC Partial Mission Capable 
PM-MTVR Product Manager-Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement  
PMO Program Management Office 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
PQT Production Qualification Testing 
PVT Production Verification Testing 
PY Production Year 
 
QDR Quality Deficiency Report 
 
 xvi
RAM Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation 
RFP Request for Proposal 
R&D Research & Development 
RD&A Research, Development and Acquisition 
RMS Root Mean Square 
R-TOC Reduction of Total Ownership Cost 
 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SLEP Service Life Extension Program 
S&S Stewart & Stevenson 
S&T         Science & Technology 
SOU Special Operating Units 
SMAR Smart Intelligent Systems Intelligent Vehicle 
SSEB Source Selection Evaluation Board 
STAR System Threat Assessment Report 
SYSCOM System Command 
 
T-AC Tank-Automotive Center 
TACOM Tank-automotive and Armament Command 
TARDEC Tank-Automotive Research, Development and 
Engineering Center 
TARADCOM Tank-Automotive Research and Development 
Command 
TARCOM Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command 
TDP Technical Data Package 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
TC Type Classification 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
TSAC TACOM Security Assistance Center 
TSV Theater Support Vessel 
TWV Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 
 
US United States 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics) 
 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
WECOM Weapons Command  






The author would like to acknowledge the many people who have freely 
offered timely assistance, advice, support, information, and counsel that enabled 
me to write this thesis.  I especially would like to acknowledge the advice, 
guidance, and, above all, the patience of my thesis advisor, Lieutenant Colonel 
Brad Naegle (USA, Ret.), without whose enduring support this thesis would not 
have been possible.  I would also like to thank Colonel Mike Boudreau (USA, 
Ret.) for taking on this thesis as the second reader on short notice.  His timely 
thoughtful input and comments were most welcome.  
I would like to thank my editors Rena Henderson and Nancy Sharrock for 
their timely help and support in the completion of this thesis.  I would also like to 
thank Mr. Richard Andrews for reading over my thesis and making countless 
improvements, all of which were very greatly appreciated. 
I would also like to thank the U.S. Marine Corps, especially Andrew 
Faulkner and Paul Neubert for their input and candid remarks on the MTVR 
Program, and the Marine Corps Historical Office. 
I would also like to thank the TACOM History Office and the TACOM 
Historians Ann Bos and Randy Talbot for their countless hours of research and 
their willingness to share TACOM’s proud history with this author. 
I would like to thank the PM MTVR Product Office, especially the former 
Product Manager, Lieutenant Colonel Walt Raymond  (USA, Ret.), to whom I am 
indebted for key research data and the direction of this thesis. I also want to 
thank Lieutenant Colonel George Schneller (USA, Ret.), Major Mike Loos 
(USMC, Ret.), Sue Brown, Major Dennis Haag (USMC, Ret.), Jeff Darnell, all of 




Above all, I would also like to thank my parents, Jack and Barbara 
Schramm, for their support and never-ending patience in the completion of this 
thesis.  My father has authored several books himself, and now I can fully 
appreciate the amount of effort and time that he must have devoted in the 
research and publication of his work. To my parents, I am truly indebted.  I only 







In the early 1990s, the Army and the Marine Corps identified a need to 
modernize their medium tactical wheeled fleets.  At the direction of Congress, the 
Marine Corp’s Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Program was 
combined with the Army’s Five-Ton Truck Remanufacture Program in 1996 as a 
single Acquisition Category (ACAT) II Program.  However, due to budget 
constraints, the Army program was terminated in 1998. 
As a result of this termination, the Army was left with a Product Office 
overseeing a Marine Corps truck program.  Army program management of 
Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicles has been accomplished for many years.  
In most cases, the systems managed were joint programs or Marine Corps 
procurement of existing Army systems such as the High Mobility Multi-purpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).  The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) and the Light 
Armored Vehicle (LAV) programs are exceptions, and like the MTVR, are Marine 
Corps unique systems with significant Army involvement in the systems 
management. 
The Army’s participation in providing the Marine Corps with a project office 
for the MTVR Program benefited the USMC by providing a professional and 
experienced base of acquisition professionals to lead and manage the program.  
The Army professionals were provided valuable experience on a cutting-edge 
technology project with experienced industry partners.  
This experience demonstrated that a joint or multi-service project team 
can be effective in developing a single-service product. Both services gained 
valuable knowledge and experience that can be used today and in future 
program and project offices. Such working arrangements benefit DoD in several 
ways.  Project office overheads can be minimized, and knowledge and 
experience gained from one project in one service can be shared with other 
services.   
 xx
Research of the MTVR Program revealed that the Marine Corps was 
extremely satisfied with the Army’s performance in leading and managing this 
program.  However, the long-range Marine Corps strategy was to have its 
various acquisition programs centrally located at Quantico, Virginia.  The study of 
the Marine Corps’ MTVR transition plan examined several possible alternatives 
to determine the optimal time to transition the program from the U.S. Army to the 
Marine Corps at Quantico. 
Based on these studies, it was determined that the least disruptive 
alternative would have been to leave the current MTVR organization and 
structure in place within the Army’s Program Executive Office-Ground Combat 
and Support Systems (PEO-GCSS) at Warren, Michigan.  Despite this 
conclusion from the Marine Corps’ own report, the Marine Corps leadership 
decided to relocate the program to Quantico after the Milestone III decision on 
the program.  This choice met the Marine Corps Commanders’ requirement to 
move the program office to Quantico and establish a center of acquisition 
excellence. 
The overall MTVR program goal was to obtain a cost-effective, state-of-
the-art vehicle to replace the Marine Corps’ medium tactical truck.  This was 
accomplished by a unique Product Office administered during its life by both the 
Army and the Marine Corps.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to analyze the United States Marine 
Corps’ (USMC) Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Program.  This 
thesis examines the unique situation in which the Army provided the program 
management expertise through Milestone III to execute this Marine Corps-unique 
program. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This thesis addresses an Acquisition Category II (ACAT II) program that 
was originally a joint Army-Marine Corps program.  In 1996, Congress directed 
the Army and the Marine Corps to “harmonize” their efforts for the remanufacture 
aspect of each service’s medium tactical vehicle modernization program.  Due to 
severe budget cuts in the 1990s, the Army chose to terminate its portion in 1998.  
However, the Marine Corps continued to have a requirement for this truck.  The 
Marines had the necessary funding, but not the Product Office manpower to staff 
and effectively manage the program. 
In the early 1990s, both the Army and the Marine Corps identified a need 
to modernize their medium tactical wheeled fleets.  The goal of the program for 
the Marine Corps was to field a cost-effective, state-of-the-art system to replace 
its existing fleet of M809 and M939/A1 series of medium tactical trucks.  The July 
1991 Mission Area Analysis (MAA) for Close Combat identified deficiencies in the 
Marine Corps’ existing medium-truck fleet’s mobility and load carrying capacity.  
Additional operational experience in Southwest Asia reinforced evidence that the 
existing fleet had significant deficiencies in traveling off-road when fully loaded or 
when towing the M198 Howitzer.  
The Marine Corps’ current medium-truck fleet consists of M939 series 
trucks procured in the early 80s.  Although the Corps procured new trucks, the 
basic truck design has remained largely unchanged since the mid-1950s, with 
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little or no significant improvement in reliability and fuel efficiency.  The current 
medium-truck fleet lacks true cross-country mobility and is essentially road 
bound. 
When operating off-road, the M939 series truck’s straight axle suspension 
and limited power train restrict it from achieving sufficient speed/mobility to 
support highly mobile combat units.  As the M198 Howitzer prime mover, it limits 
the weapon system to firing positions only accessible by existing road networks.  
Also, its limited payload means that the available cargo bed space cannot be 
used when carrying high-density loads such as ammunition and bulk liquids. 
These deficiencies along with others, in conjunction with their entire M939 
tactical truck fleet reaching the end of its Economic Useful Life (EUL) in FY 2002, 
prompted the Marine Corps to publish the Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
number MOB 211.4.2.A dated 30 March 1992.  This MNS clearly defines the 
needs of a new platform to replace the existing M939 fleet.  [Ref. 1] 
The Army, on the other hand, originally had planned to remanufacture a 
portion of its aging fleet of M809 and M939/A1 vehicles to augment the 
procurement of the new five-ton version of the Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicles (FMTV).  The remanufacture effort was to address many of the same 
MAA-identified deficiencies and provide Army operational and performance 
requirements similar (but not equal to) the new FMTV.  At the direction of 
Congress, the Marine Corps’ Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 
Program was combined with the U.S. Army Five-Ton Truck Remanufacture 
(5TTR) Program in 1996 as a single Acquisition Category II (ACAT) Program.  
However, due to budget constraints, the Army program was prematurely 
terminated in May 1998.  This thesis analyzes the MTVR Program and how a 
joint or multi-service program operates from a variety of different perspectives 
and players. The thesis also addresses transition of the program from the Army 
to the Marine Corps. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question   
The primary research question is: What impact did Army management of 
the MTVR Program have on the Marine Corps future acquisition methodology? 
2. Supplemental Research Questions 
The supplemental research questions are: 
• Was the transition of the MTVR program from the Army to the 
Marine Corps adequately studied and planned? 
• How did the decision to transition the MTVR program from the U.S. 
Army to the Marine Corps impact the program? 
• What impact will the establishment of the Marine Corps new 
acquisition center at Quantico have on future joint or multi-service 
acquisitions?  
D. SCOPE 
This thesis provides a detailed background and historical perspective of 
the development of the PM-MTVR Product Office and examines, from a product-
management perspective, the events that led to a joint Army-Marine Corps 
program.  It analyzes the perceived program effectiveness from the viewpoint of 
both the Army and the Marine Corps and addresses how the program is viewed 
the Prime Contractor.  The thesis also evaluates the transition of the MTVR 
Product Office from the Army to the Marine Corps at Quantico and its impact on 
the program.  An in-depth search and analysis of available articles and printed 
materials regarding the MTVR was conducted.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study is based, in part, on an extensive search of available literature 
originating from within DoD and the industry in general.  In addition, information 
was gathered via several structured field interviews at Army and contractor 
locations over a three-year period, as well as via phone interviews with Marine 
Corps Product Office management.  A detailed Program Questionnaire was 
provided to current and former personnel who worked in the MTVR Product 
Office.  The questionnaire addressed several categories and included 27 
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questions involving the MTVR Program.  The author attended several In-Process 
Reviews (IPRs) and cost-reduction meetings at the prime contractor location to 
gain the contractor perspective and participated in transition meetings between 
the Army and the Marine Corps. These field interviews and studies were 
supplemented by additional interviews of Army and Marine Corps key personnel 
who oversee the MTVR program.  Finally, the study was based on analyses of 
the various program briefings, proposals, interviews, questionnaire results, and 
transition plans and studies that have been created to date and makes 
recommendations based on the analyses.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
The study is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I:  Introduction—This chapter addresses the scope of the 
thesis, identifies the methodology used, presents the research 
questions, and lays out benefits of the thesis. 
• Chapter II:  MTVR Program Background—This chapter provides a 
history of Marine Corps Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Programs 
managed by the Army.  It also provides background on the MTVR 
Program.  
• Chapter III:  MTVR Program Management—This chapter provides 
the Marine Corps’, the Army’s, and Oshkosh Truck’s perspective on 
the MTVR Program.  The data were obtained from research, 
multiple interviews over a three-year period, and a detailed program 
questionnaire. The chapter also analyzes the decisions and 
perceptions stemming from the transition of the MTVR Program 
from the Army to the Marine Corps. 
• Chapter IV: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations —The 
data presented and analyzed in Chapters II and III were evaluated 
to provide answers to the primary and secondary thesis questions.  
Recommendations are made for additional research.   
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This study addresses the unique relationship between the U.S. Army and 
the U.S. Marine Corps, where a dedicated Army Product Management Office 
managed a Marine Corps sole-service program.  A detailed historical profile of 
the program traces the evolution of the program from a joint Army/Marine Corps 
effort on similar remanufactured systems, to the Army management of a Marine 
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Corps-unique Non-Developmental Item (NDI) system.  The analysis is based on 
input from the major parties directly involved in and affected by this joint services 
managed program.  Included are an examination of the benefits and challenges 
of a joint services program, as well as an analysis of the formal studies and 
recommendations that led to the decision to transition the program from the Army 
product office to a newly established Marine Corps product manager.  
Recommendations resulting from these analyses will assist other USMC and 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF U.S. MARINE 
CORPS TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES 
Army program management of Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicles 
has been accomplished for many years.  In most cases, the systems managed 
were joint programs or Marine Corps procurement of existing Army systems such 
as the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).  The Logistics 
Vehicle System (LVS) and the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) programs, however, 
are exceptions and, like the MTVR, are Marine Corps unique systems with 
significant Army involvement in the systems’ management. 
1. Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) 
In the mid-1970s, the USMC began exploratory development for logistics 
vehicles that would transport weapons, communications equipment, and general 
cargo during the 1985-1990 timeframe.  Among the dominant requirements were 
that the vehicles be transported in container ship cells, that they be compatible 
with American National Standards Institute/International Standards Organization 
(ANSI/ISO) shelters and containers, and that they be able to satisfy the 
increased cross-country mobility needs of combat service support elements of 
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). [Ref. 2] 
In December 1978, an announcement in the Commerce Business Daily 
solicited heavy automotive and construction equipment industries to provide data 
regarding commercially available or modified vehicular equipment that could 
satisfy the USMC requirements.  Twenty-one companies responded, and several 
candidate vehicles were identified.  Based on careful evaluation, a Source 
Selection Evaluation Board approved the procurement from Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation (OTC) (see Appendix B). 
The LVS, known as the “Dragon Wagon” to leathernecks of the Marine 
Corps Service Support School, replaced the M123 ten-ton tractor, the M543 
wrecker, the M52 five-ton tractor, and the M127 12-ton stake bed trailer.  The 
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vehicle is not amphibious, but it can ford rivers, lakes, and streams with a depth 
of up to five feet.  It features a Detroit Diesel V-8, 445 hp engine and an Allison 
four-speed automatic transmission. It has a top speed of 65 mph. [Ref. 2] 
The USMC’s LVS is comprised of two separate chassis modules that are 
coupled through an articulation joint to form an integral, all-wheel drive, 8x8 
vehicle.  The system includes the following four 4x4 rear modules, each of which 
is connected to a MK48 4x4 Heavy Prime Mover Power Unit: MK14 Powered 
Container/Shelter Unit; MK115 Powered Wrecker/Recovery Unit; MK16 Powered 
Fifth Wheel Unit; and MK17 Powered Drop Side Cargo Unit. 
In September 1983, OTC was awarded a sole-source multiyear contract 
for 1,433 systems.  Vehicle Initial Production Testing (IPT) commenced in May 
1984 and was completed in March 1985.  Production deliveries commenced in 
August 1985. 
The LVS development program ran concurrent to the U.S. Army’s Heavy 
Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) development effort.  In brief, the 
HEMTT is a Non-Developmental Item produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation 
that shares 80 percent of its components with the LVS.  Thus, the sole source 
justification, as prepared by a joint Headquarters, USMC/TACOM working group, 
allows the Army and the Marine Corps to take maximum advantage of the 
component commonality. 
The LVS is a Marine Corps unique system that is managed by the Project 
Manager for Heavy Tactical Vehicles, an Army Materiel Command (AMC) PM 
under the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM).  While the LVS 
is unique to the Marines, it is a derivative of the Army’s HEMTT and is procured 
under the heavy truck family of contracts, which significantly reduces overhead 
costs and results in a lower unit cost for the Marine Corps.  The Army expertise 
in managing and supporting tactical wheeled vehicles has resulted in a distinct 
acquisition advantage for the Marine Corps. [Ref. 2] 
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2. Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 
The LAV program was initiated in June 1981 as a jointly-managed Marine 
Corps/Army program, collocated at the Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments 
Command (TACOM) (see Appendix A).  In 1983, the U.S. Army decided to 
terminate its portion, leaving the LAV an all-Marine Corps Program.  A number of 
Army LAV vehicles were produced; however, they were never fielded and 
eventually were sold to the Marine Corps.  The LAV Mission Element Need 
Statement (MENS) dated 8 May 1981 indicates the Marine Corps’ view of Army 
management:  
[Because of] the Army’s experience in acquiring armored vehicles, 
the history of cooperation which has marked earlier programs in 
which the Army acquired equipment for the USMC, the Army is 
designated as the contracting agency with overall acquisition 
responsibility for the USMC LAV Program.  Every effort will be 
made by both services to expedite delivery of this urgently required 
system. [Ref. 3]  
The Marines have been very satisfied with this program and the Army’s 
active participation in it. [Ref. 2]   
Mr. Robert Walters, Deputy Program Manager (DPM) for the LAV 
program, was interviewed on 22 November 2000.  The LAV is a Marine Corps 
program executed by the Army at TACOM, but unlike the PM-MTVR Program, 
the PM-LAV office has a Marine Corps Colonel in charge, along with five 
additional Marine Corps Officers assigned to the program.  In answer to a 
question regarding executing a Marine Corps program, Walters stated, “We are 
all Marines. Period! And proud of it!”  However, his reporting chain of command is 
through the Army Materiel Command (AMC), Deputy for Systems Acquisition 
(DSA).  With regard to the Marine Corps’ plan to consolidate many of its 
acquisition programs at a newly established acquisition center at Hospital Point, 
Quantico, VA (see Appendix D) might affect the PM-LAV, Walters stated that he 
was aware of the new acquisition center, but that there were no plans to relocate 
the PM-LAV Office there, or to any other location, other than TACOM, at that 
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time.  In his opinion, it would be unwise to relocate the office because, he 
believes, 99% of the office staff, if offered a position elsewhere, would not 
relocate.  This would be a major detriment to the continuity of the program and 
significant program expertise would be lost.  A second reason for remaining at 
TACOM is that PM-LAV has some very large Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 
principally to Saudi Arabia (1117 vehicles), along with possible sales to Taiwan 
and others. Brazil, Spain, Chile, and Poland also have made serious inquiries.  
FMS is coordinated through the Security Assistance Center located at TACOM.  
A move from TACOM could negatively impact the program and possibly 
jeopardize these and future FMS sales. [Ref. 4] 
B.   ARMY’S FMTV- IMPACT ON THE MTVR 
1.   FMTV Program Background 
The Marine Corps and the Army traditionally harmonize their truck 
programs, looking for a common vehicle that could be produced for both 
services.  In the earlier stages of military truck development (1970-1980), trucks 
in different services had only two or three factors in common, such as their 
suspensions, engines, and transmissions.  The new vehicle was striving for 80% 
commonality, such as with the 2 ½ -ton truck, in all variants produced.  
The FMTV was developed as a joint program and, as such, was 
developed from a Joint Services Operating Requirement (JSOR).  The Marines 
later changed their requirement to a heavy-weight-class vehicle.  
There are several basic engineering differences between the FMTV and 
the MTVR including MTVR’s independent suspension system, developed by the 
British. This is to accommodate the MTVR’s requirement that the truck be used 
70% for off-road use and 30% on-road.   
The current manufacturer of the FMTV, Stewart & Stevenson Inc., did 
submit a bid for the Marine Corps MTVR truck program, but was not selected.  
The Marines have expressed a requirement for one current variation of the FMTV  
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vehicle, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), a multiple launch rocket 
system mounted on the FMTV.  However, this will not be required until 2005. 
[Ref. 5] 
2.   Corrosion Standards 
The ability of the DoD to respond rapidly to national security and foreign 
commitments can be adversely affected by corrosion. Corrosion of military 
equipment and facilities has been a significant problem for many years. Indeed, it 
can be a leading cause of catastrophic equipment failure. The corrosion-related 
problems are becoming more prominent, as the acquisition of new equipment is 
decreasing, and the services must rely upon aging systems.  The data provided 
by the military services indicate that corrosion is potentially the number one cost 
driver in life-cycle costs.  The total annual direct cost of corrosion incurred by the 
military services for both systems and infrastructure was estimated at $20 billion. 
Corrosion prevention is less expensive than equipment replacement. [Ref. 6] 
The FMTV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) included a 
corrosion specification calling for a ten-year requirement. Corrosion protection is 
not a coating, but, rather, a comprehensive system consisting of three major 
components: 1) design; 2) metal selection; and 3) processing.  A second line of 
defense would be coatings. 
Multiple companies submitted initial proposals for the FMTV contract, the 
leading ones being Stewart & Stevenson, Tactical Truck (consortium of BMY and 
General Motors) and Teledyne.  The proposal from Stewart & Stevenson could 
not meet the contract specification. Although the proposal from Tactical Truck 
could, it would cost more per unit truck.  Its corrosion resistance plan included a 
galvanized truck, better coatings, better configuration, better composites, and 
superior architecture. [Ref. 7] 
The Marine Corps MTVR Truck incorporated a 22-year corrosion 
standard.  This was based on the Marine Corps’ operational requirements, which, 
unlike the Army’s FMTV, included fording requirements.  The MTVR is required 
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to be operationally capable, without damage, of fording hard-bottomed crossings 
of fresh or salt water at not less than 1.52m (60 in.) including wave height, 
without requiring adjustments or the addition of special equipment.  All vehicles 
had to operate continuously on land after fording operations, without damage to 
the vehicle.  With the Central Tire Inflation System (CTIS) at an emergency 
setting, vehicles were to ford hard-bottomed, fresh or salt-water crossings, 
remaining immersed for a period of 30 minutes. [Ref. 6]   
The 22-year standard was based on economics.  It also led to the next 
generation of tests, conducted in the late 1990s, as opposed to the FMTV’s tests, 
which were conducted in the early to mid-1990s.  The initial MTVR corrosion 
resistance tests were conducted at the Milford Proving Grounds by General 
Motors. Additional tests were conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), 
where the test standards were upgraded from the previous standard of ten years 
to the newly accepted standard of 22 years. The Marine Corps corrosion 
standard was so stringent that the contractor for the FMTV, Stewart & 
Stevenson, could not meet the standard during the Request for Proposal (RFP) 
contract phase. [Ref. 7] 
C.  MEDIUM TACTICAL REPLACEMENT VEHICLE (MTVR) PROGRAM 
1. Program Goals 
The goal of the program for the USMC was to field a cost-effective, state-
of-the-art system to replace its existing fleet of M809 and M939/A1 series of 
medium tactical trucks.  The July 1991 Mission Area Analysis (MAA) for Close 
Combat identified deficiencies in the Marine Corps’ current medium-truck fleet 
mobility and load-carrying capacity.  These deficiencies could not be adequately 
addressed by any minor modification, change in tactics or organizational change; 
therefore, a materiel solution was sought.   
The MAA also revealed operational differences between Marine Corps 
wheeled vehicle mission requirements and those of the Army, despite the fact 
that both have used nearly identical wheeled systems for decades.  For example, 
a typical mobility profile for an Army wheeled system specifies a 70/30 (70% on-
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road, 30% off-road) profile, while the Marine MAA identified the reverse profile: 
30/70.  Clearly, the Army’s new five-ton family of Medium Tactical Vehicles could 
not satisfy the deficiencies described in the MAA. [Ref. 8] 
2. MTVR Operational and System Description 
The Marine Corps is tasked to deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 
(MAGTF) throughout the world to conduct expeditionary operations across a 
wide operational continuum.  In order to accomplish any assigned mission, the 
MAGTF requires a ground transport vehicle that is mobile, reliable, and flexible.  
The medium tactical vehicle is the most numerous of the ground logistical lift 
vehicles and performs a wide range of transportation missions within the Marine 
Corps. [Ref. 8] 
The MTVR supports Mission Area 43, Transportation.  The requirement 
for the MTVR is outlined in Mission Need Statement (MNS) Number MOB 
211.4.2A, approved by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and 
issued by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command on 30 March 1992.  The MNS describes the need for an MTVR with 
technical high mobility, capable of carrying a heavier payload than the current 
vehicle with no increase in strategic-lift footprint relative to the M939A1. [Ref. 8] 
The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps provides a constraint on the 
numbers and sizes of all systems for combat, combat support, and combat 
service support.  Consequently, conscious efforts have been made to minimize 
the mix and types of vehicles within the Marine Motor Transport Fleet.  The 
medium truck is the true “workhorse” of the Marine Corps and is called upon to 
perform a wide range of missions and carry a wide range of loads.  It fills the gap 
between the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which 
comprises the light-vehicle fleet, and the Logistics Vehicle System (LSV), which 
comprises the heavy-vehicle fleet. [Ref. 9] 
The MTVR will serve as the Marine Corps’ only medium tactical vehicle.  
The medium truck is the prime logistical bulk load vehicle and the primary system 
 14
used to move supplies, equipment, personnel and ammunition to forward units.  
Increasing the cross-country capability in terms of payload, speed, and ability to 
negotiate rough terrain is essential in meeting the Marine Corps’ needs across all 
spectrums of conflict. 
The MTVR replaces the existing fleet of aging M809 and M939 series of 
five-ton trucks.  The MTVR is a new truck with enhanced capabilities and greater 
mobility than the existing fleet and is designed to meet Marine Corps worldwide 
missions, including along the littorals, regions typically lacking in infrastructure.  
The Marine Corps’ medium-truck fleet serves as a primary delivery system for 
the entire range of forward-deployed units.  The prime mover for towed artillery, 
the MTVR also functions as the principal means of transporting bulk fuel, water, 
ammunition, break-bulk cargo, equipment, and personnel.  The MTVR also 
reinforces the wholesale delivery, heavy-haul mission of the Logistics Vehicle 
System (LVS).  With a weight of 28,000 lbs., the MTVR’s footprint is otherwise 
identical to the M939.  However, with a 70% off-road mission profile, the MTVR 
offers a significant increase in hauling capacity (7.1 tons off-road and 15 tons on-
road) and mobility (30 mph cross-country).  The MTVR can closely keep pace 
with the M1A1 tank, Light Armored Vehicle, and Amphibious Assault Vehicle to 
support emerging maneuver and precision logistics concepts. [Ref. 9] 
The original Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) was 7,360 vehicles 
(Standard Cargo: 5,740; Extra Long Wheel Base Cargo: 750; Dump: 522; 
Wrecker: 348;) with funding for only 6,854 appropriated. The AAO was adjusted 
22 August 2001 by the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) 
from the original 7,360 to 6,393 vehicles (Standard Cargo: 4881; Extra Long 
Wheel Base: 727; Dump: 477; Wrecker: 308). Funds appropriated for the MTVR 
were also adjusted at the same time, bringing the total trucks funded from the 
original 6,854 to the new AAO level of 6,393. [Refs. 10, 11] 
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Competing contractors, Oshkosh Truck Corporation (OTC) and AM 
General (AMG), received competitive Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) contracts in November 1996 to produce five prototypes each for 
competitive testing.  A third competitor, Stewart & Stevenson, failed to receive an 
award.  [Ref. 10] 
During EMD testing in July 1998, the Naval Center for Cost Analysis found 
that the MTVR operational requirements, some of which included 22-year 
corrosion protection and increased payloads on-and-off road at higher speeds, 
had rendered many of the components of the existing five-ton truck fleet 
obsolete. Some of the components found to be obsolete included the suspension 
system, engine, transmission, frame, cab, and cargo bed.  The Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RDA)) 
then redirected the program from a remanufacturing effort to a new procurement 
since procurement of new vehicles, as opposed to the remanufacturing of the 
existing five-ton components, was determined to be the only sustainable 
alternative. [Ref. 10] 
3. Marine Corps Advanced Technology Demonstration and 
Acquisition Streamlining 
To meet the MAA identified requirements, the Marine Corps MTVR would 
require technological innovations not currently available on U.S.-manufactured 
trucks.  The Marines wanted to demonstrate these new technologies before 
committing to a full program, so they initiated the Marine Corps Advance 
Technology Transition Demonstrator (MCATTD).  The technology demonstration 
evaluation showed that the MCATTD concept was sufficiently mature to proceed 
directly to the EMD phase and avoid the cost and time of a separate Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase.  This was accomplished through 
the integration of proven components and the unique teaming of industry.  The 
privately owned and financed Nevada Automotive Test Center (NATC) was 
contracted as the technology demonstrator integrator, utilizing many other 
component manufacturers’ expertise in the effort. [Ref. 10]  
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NATC was required to design, engineer, and fabricate the Marine Corps’ 
Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator (MCATTD) in conjunction with 
the Amphibious Warfare Technology Directorate as a proof-of-concept vehicle.  
In the first phase, a standard M923A1 cargo truck was fitted with an independent 
suspension system and a central tire inflation system.  The existing power train 
was not altered.  After shakedown testing to establish engineering integrity, a 
series of controlled tests were conducted to compare the MCATTD with a 
standard M923A1 five-ton truck.  These tests defined the impact of an 
independent suspension in terms of shock and vibration, ride quality, and load 
carrying capacity.  Concurrent with these tests, a study of Marine Corps Combat 
Development Center (MCCDC) operational areas was conducted to establish 
performance parameters.  Full engineering evaluation (Phase 0, Test and 
Evaluation) of the MCATTD started in April 1992.  An Early Operational 
Assessment (EOA) was also conducted following the technical testing.  The 
MTVR Program entered the (EMD) Phase after receiving Milestone I/II approval 
from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN (RDA)) in October 1995. [Ref. 10] 
Government/industry teaming greatly added to the streamlining of the 
MTVR acquisition, and other streamlining initiatives flowed from the teaming.  
The use of performance-based specifications, incorporating unambiguous 
engineering terms easily understood by the heavy-truck industry, was a direct 
result of the teaming efforts.  This alleviated many issues that would normally 
surface later in the acquisition process.  
For example, the term “cross-country” is inherently ambiguous and would 
likely be interpreted differently by the user, tester, or industry.  To eliminate this 
ambiguity, road and terrain roughness was defined mathematically as a function 
of the engineering terms Root Mean Square (RMS) and Wave Number Spectrum 
(WNS).  RMS and WNS for various types of terrain were included in the 
performance specification to give engineers a precise definition of the term 
“cross-country.” [Ref. 12] 
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Through the application and tailoring of specifications and standards, the 
MTVR phase I RFP contained only eight required military specifications and 
standards.  Of these, four were directly related to military transportability 
requirements, and the remaining four addressed military unique safety and 
survivability issues.  The tailoring of military specifications in the MTVR RFP 
meant that the specification expressed program requirements in terms of mission 
performance and operational effectiveness, versus the rigid detailed 
requirements that traditionally characterized military specifications. [Ref. 12] 
4. Industry Involvement/IPTs 
All of these reform measures were facilitated through early industry 
involvement in this program.  Prior to the drafting of the MTVR specification, an 
open invitation was issued for several “industry days” hosted by the Nevada 
Automotive Test Center.  On these days, contractors could view the MCATTDS 
to obtain and impart information regarding the proposed program. Notices were 
published in the Commerce Business Daily.  Shortly after industry days, a draft 
MTVR System Specification was distributed to industry for comment, followed by 
the release of a full draft RFP.  More than 900 questions and comments were 
received from industry, many of which were incorporated into the Phase I MTVR 
performance specification. [Ref. 13] 
Another acquisition reform measure implemented by the MTVR program 
was the early establishment of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to help manage 
the program.  Several additional IPTs were created as the program evolved.  The 
mission of the IPT is to facilitate the close coordination of the various elements of 
the MTVR acquisition team and to ensure that integration of all activities from 
development through fielding are managed to meet the cost and performance 
objectives. 
Since much of the R&D work was done through the building and testing of 
MCATTDS, the program was able to compress the EMD phase of the acquisition.  
Contractor logistics costs were limited during Developmental Testing (DT) in 
order to avoid paying both EMD contractors for this effort. Confidence in the 
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reliability and maintainability of the commercial components used in the system 
made this decision possible. By not procuring logistics support from both 
contractors, the PM-MTVR was able to reduce both cost and time during the 
EMD phase. Long-term Contractor Logistics Support would be procured from the 
winning contractor during Phase II of this program. [Ref. 13] 
There was extensive use of modeling and simulation in the Phase I 
contract award, which saved both time and money. In addition, the Government 
entered into an agreement with both EMD contractors whereby they had access 
to the TACOM super computer to conduct simulations to help in their design 
efforts. They planned to carry this effort forward into the production phase.  
Prior to the release of the Draft EMD Request for Proposal (RFP) to 
industry, Marine PM-Combat Support and Logistics Equipment (CSLE) requested 
two bottom-up reviews of the program from outside agencies. These reviews 
served to validate the program’s approach in terms of acquisition strategy, the 
method of contracting, funding, and streamlining efforts.  The Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RDA)) Acquisition 
Reform Office, RFP Support Team conducted the first of these reviews. [Ref. 13] 
This team reviewed the draft RFP during March 1996 and then, in April, 
debriefed the Product Manager of its findings. The team did a complete review of 
the specifications and standards contained in the RFP, and they also provided 
the PM with suggestions and samples of contract clauses to further streamline 
the effort. The team found the draft RFP in concert with “acquisition reform and 
streamlining concepts.” They also stated that the MTVR draft RFP was one of the 
better ones they had reviewed. 
The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) instructors 
conducted the second review. The DSMC “Red Team” was the resident expert 
on the latest DoD 5000 series policy, and its instructors were all acquisition 
professionals from the areas of test and evaluation, contracting, finance, program  
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management, logistics, and systems engineering. The PM provided acquisition 
documentation to the team in December for review and was debriefed in April on 
the findings. 
Strengths and weaknesses in program management, logistics, test and 
evaluation, and contracting were highlighted and discussed, with solutions 
recommended where appropriate. The team found that the program was sound 
and that it adhered to the basic principles of acquisition streamlining. However, 
the DSMC Red team did find that the MTVR Program had significant schedule 
risk. [Ref. 13] 
5.   USMC Selection of Army Program Management  
The MAA-generated requirements for the Marines’ medium truck meant 
that, for the first time in decades, the Marines were not going to procure the 
same truck as the Army.  The MTVR management office at Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) was too small and lacked the 
supporting structure to manage an ACAT II program effectively.  The Marine 
Corps was aware that the Army had successfully remanufactured medium 
tactical trucks and were exploring a remanufacture effort of the existing Army 
five-ton fleet to augment the procurement of new FMTVs.  At the time, there was 
a possibility of reutilizing components from the USMC five-ton fleet as part of the 
MTVR effort, so the Marines decided to pursue a remanufacture effort for the 
MTVR and selected the existing Extended Service Program (ESP) Product 
Manager Office to manage the MTVR.  PM-ESP staffing would be augmented by 
USMC personnel from MARCORSYSCOM, and the Marines eventually 
established a USMC Major position within PM-ESP. [Ref. 14] 
6.   USMC/Army Combined Medium Tactical Truck Remanufacture 
(MTTR) EMD Prototype Testing and Contract Strategies 
Both of the EMD contractors were proven military truck manufacturers with 
the technical expertise to design, integrate, and produce the systems and 
components required for the MTVR and were able to meet surge and  
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mobilization requirements.  The intent of selecting experienced contractors was 
to maximize the use of commercially available components, with an emphasis on 
those components already within the DoD system.  [Ref. 10] 
During the prototype competition of the EMD phase, two contractors, AM 
General Corporation of South Bend, Indiana (AMG) and Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, (OTC) were selected for award of a Cost-
Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract using full and open competitive procedures.  
The contracts were awarded in November 1996.  
Each contractor was required to design, produce, and deliver five Marine 
Corps- and five Army-configured vehicles, and to support Government conducted 
testing.  Both contractors built five prototype trucks using components of the 
basic model M939 trucks, combined with new technology insertion.  Both 
contractors successfully completed prototype testing of these vehicles in about 
half the allotted time, with a reliability rate three times the prototype requirement.  
The two contractors were invited to submit production contract proposals. [Ref. 
10] 
Based on those proposals and the results of the phase I testing, the U.S. 
Army awarded the production contract to Oshkosh Truck Corporation on 12 
February 1999 for the USMC portion of the MTTR program only.  The contract 
was Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) with Economic Price Adjustments (EPA).  The 
USMC acquisition objective was 7,360 vehicles, but funds were programmed for 
approximately 6,854 vehicles.  The production contract featured a procurement 
option for an additional 1,694 systems to funded requirements of 5,666 systems 
to allow procurement of up to the total USMC requirement of 7,360 vehicles, 
were the additional funding to become available.  An additional option for the 808 
vehicles was included in the original contract for potential requirements from 
other customers. [Ref. 10] 
This five-year contract with Oshkosh Truck Corporation expired in FY04, 
with final production of the MTVR Truck planned for June 2005 and final fielding 
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of the last of the 6,393 MTVR Trucks expected in September 2005.  A new 
follow-on five-year contract was expected to be signed in June 2004.  This 
contract will service the Navy’s Seabees purchase of MTVR Trucks.  These 
trucks will include the Standard Cargo, Wreckers, Dump Truck, and a variant 
unique to the Seabees, a Chassis Truck (Cargo Truck with a platform rather than 
a bed).  The Seabees have a requirement of 1641 MTVR Trucks.  The current 
contract will procure 537 trucks with funds appropriated in FY04-09 for an 
additional 710 of the required remaining 1104 MTVR Trucks. [Ref. 11]   
7. LRIP and Production Testing 
The Detailed Test Plan (DTP) identified specific requirements for the Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) for the Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement Program.  The IOT&E was conducted by the Marine Corps Test 
and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) to collect data and observations concerning 
the performance of the Low Rate Initial Production cargo variant MTVRs against 
selected Operational Requirements Document (ORD) criteria.  The test results 
were used by the ASN(RDA) as the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) in the 12 
April 2001 Milestone III decision to authorize full-rate production and fielding. 
[Ref. 15]   
In addition to an Early Operational Assessment (EOA) of the original 
MTVR technical demonstration in April 1995, an Operational Assessment (OA) of 
candidate EMD prototypes from OTC and the AMG was conducted as part of the 
development testing from January to April 1998.  Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) 
Marines operated and maintained the EMD vehicles for the final 8,000 miles of a 
planned 12,000-mile development endurance test.  Twenty-nine criteria were 
evaluated using data extracted from the developmental test or from separate 
discrete test events using Marine operators.   
All phases of IOT&E used FMF operators and mechanics to operate and 
maintain the systems and collect data needed to analyze measures of 
performance, effectiveness and suitability.  Testing followed realistic operational 
scenarios to the maximum extent possible.  Evaluation areas included mission 
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performance, survivability, cooperative systems, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, transportability, deployability, personnel selection and training, 
concept of employment, organizational impacts, supportability, human factors, 
and safety. [Ref. 15] 
The MCOTEA Test Directorate consisted of a Test Directorate with FMF 
Marines drawn from Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF).  The IOT&E was 
conducted in four phases, each including a series of operational missions and 
specific test events.  Phases included cold weather operations at Ft. Greely, AK; 
sustained operations at Twentynine Palms, CA; amphibious operations at Camp 
Pendleton, CA; mountainous terrain operations at Mountain Warfare Training 
Center (MWTC), NV; and extreme slope and mud operations at the Nevada 
Automotive Test Center, NV.  Phases I and II required only two vehicles.  The 
IOT&E tested as much of the Marine Corps operational spectrum as possible, 
given time, location, and climatic conditions.  Marines operated nine MTVRs over 
a wide range of different environments to evaluate its “safe to operate and 
maintain” capability and the performance criteria established in the ORD.  The 
IOT&E was designed around eight MTVRs, but nine different vehicles were 
actually used over the test period.  Marines operated the MTVR in a wide range 
of different environments to ensure it was “safe to operate and maintain” and met 
the performance criteria established in the ORD.  The test consisted of a series 
of operational missions that included various discrete performance evaluations 
(e.g., 60% slope operations) with all the mission miles used for a Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability (RAM) assessment.  A minimum of 43,000 miles was 
required to estimate RAM parameters adequately.  The 43,000 miles were 
distributed across the mission profile and were aggregated across all the IOT&E 
vehicles. [Ref. 15]   
Operational missions included “real world” operational requirements in 
support of Marine Corps units and notional missions over prescribed courses of  
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various distances.  Certain other events, such as firing from the weapons mount, 
operation on five of six wheels, and self-recovery winch operations were discrete 
performance events.   
The IOT&E was designed to evaluate Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability (RAM) and to test performance while operating in extremes of 
terrain and weather.  A total of 51,151 RAM miles—35,376 off-road and 15,775 
on-road—were accumulated during the IOT&E.  [Ref. 15] 
The MTVR Operational Effectiveness (OE) was evaluated with specific 
performance tests, by participating in actual operational missions through day 
and night operations in snow, grassland, salt water, desert, mountainous and 
mud conditions, and by interfacing with other tactical systems.  Operational 
Suitability (OS) was determined by the RAM results, deployability as a Marine-Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) asset, logistics supportability, and Marine-machine 
interface.  The test results concluded that, while the MTVR was operationally 
effective, it was not operationally suitable and required a Follow-on Operational 
Test and Evaluation (FOT&E).   
The MTVR met all performance standards for effectiveness.  It proved to 
be a powerful, highly mobile vehicle that safely transported and delivered typical 
medium tactical vehicle loads.  It performed all required missions on gravel 
roads, mud, snow, desert, mountains, grasslands, and paved highways with little 
or no difficulty.  The MTVR exceeded the ORD range requirements and was 
compatible with existing Marine Corps medium trailers and towed artillery. [Ref. 
15]  
The performance of the MTVR in an operational environment was a 
significant improvement over the current medium tactical vehicles.  The design 
and construction of the MTVR's weapons mount proved to be an excellent and 
stable design with the exception of the gunner’s platform.  The MTVR easily 
towed the current fleet of medium trailers (M105A2, M149A2, and M353) and the  
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current M198 Howitzer.  However, the trailers and the howitzer cannot match the 
MTVR's superior off-road mobility, and the MTVR must be slowed to preserve the 
howitzer and trailers in an off-road environment. [Ref. 15]  
The MTVR failed to meet the standards for Operational Suitability.  This 
was based on its failure to meet the Critical Operational Issue (COI) for reliability.  
Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failures (MMBOMF) was 1,189, which 
failed to meet the ORD threshold of 2000 MMBOMF.  Additional concerns 
affecting the MTVR’s Operational Suitability included an Achieved Availability 
(Aa) of 83%, significantly less than the ORD requirement of 89%.  In addition to 
the OMFs, the IOT&E MTVR experienced 685 non-OMFs requiring maintenance 
action and contributing to the lower Aa.   
In a peacetime environment, day-to-day safety concerns, local and 
Federal codes, and organization/unit Standard Operating Procedures can 
preclude using a vehicle with many of these failures, even though it would still be 
classified as “mission capable” and would continue to operate in wartime.  While 
any single failure may be insignificant, the total number was a concern.  It is of 
particular concern that 58% of the failures (393 of 683) were failures 
concentrated in the body/cab/hood (266) and electrical system (127). [Ref. 15]  
Before the MTVR was deemed Operationally Suitable, and in anticipation 
of an FOT&E, it was recommended that four MTVRs, with all engineering 
changes and corrections incorporated, be tested in a typical Marine Corps 
operational environment in order to verify the reliability and effectiveness of 
engineering changes and corrections.  An FOT&E is required to address three 
primary deficiencies:  reliability as measured by OMFs; availability as measured 
by the high incidence of Non-OMFs; and the inability of the Integrated Electronic 





D. MTVR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT 
1. Army Product Management Office  
a. PM Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Remanufacture Programs 
The MTVR program was originally conceived as a joint Army-
Marine Corps Medium Tactical Truck Remanufacture (MTTR) program. The 
program’s goal for the Marines was to field a cost-effective, state-of-the-art 
system to replace its existing fleet of medium tactical trucks.  The Army had a 
parallel program goal to augment the procurement of new medium vehicles for 
the lower priority Army Reserve and National Guard Units.  The Army’s portion of 
this program consisted of its planned five-ton 5TTR, a remanufacture program for 
its aging (20+ years) five-ton truck.  The MTTR program, along with the 
Congressionally directed Extended Service Program, were to augment the FMTV 
acquisition until such time that all units could be filled with FMTVs.  The primary 
goal was to extend the service life of these trucks and substantially reduce O&S 
costs.  The goal of this program was not to make old trucks into vehicles meeting 
all requirements of the FMTV. [Ref. 16] 
Under congressional direction, the Army initiated its 2 ½ -ton 
Extended Service Program (ESP).  Congress set two program objectives: 
produce a vehicle with 80 percent of the service life of a new vehicle and at 50 
percent of the cost.  The Army initiated the ESP to augment the FMTV Program 
as an interim solution until FMTV could generate enough vehicles to fill all 
requirements. Initially, FMTV was only to be fielded to Force Package I units and 
not be available to all lower-priority units.  The ESP was intended to provide 
these units with a capable and maintainable vehicle that would reduce 
operational costs until enough FMTVs were available to fill the requirements. 
[Ref. 16] 
b. Reassigned to PM Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
(FMTV) 
The Army’s Extended Service Program was a separate Product 
Office under the Program Executive Office for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles.  It was 
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later disbanded as a product office and re-assigned to Program Manager for 
Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV).  The MTTR acquisition plan received approval in 
February 1996 and assigned to PM-FMTV.  The FMTV program was the Army’s 
premier medium-truck program and was considered a DoD competitor to the 
USMC, which was very concerned with having its new MTVR program 
subordinate to this FMTV Project Office. [Ref. 17] 
c. Reassigned as Direct Reporting Product Manager to 
PEO Ground Combat and Support Systems (GCSS) 
The Army eventually reassigned the MTTR and the 2-½-ton ESP 
Program from PM-FMTV to the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat and Support 
Systems (GCSS) Program Executive Office (PEO) in January 1998, but only a 
few months ahead of the Army’s decision to cancel its 5TTR program.  This left 
just the 2-½-ton ESP program, which itself was canceled after FY98, with final 
production occurring in April 1999.  Thus, only the Marine Corps’s MTVR 
program was left in this Product Office. [Ref. 17] 
The MTVR Product Office was jointly managed per a June 1998 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Commander, Marine Corps 
System Command (COMMARCORSYSCOM) and the U.S. Army Program 
Executive Officer for Ground Combat and Support Systems (PEO-GCSS). The 
PM-MTVR office was staffed by one Army Lieutenant Colonel, one civilian 
Deputy Project Manager, one Assistant PM (APM) Army Major, 16 civilian Army 
employees and a contractor, as well as two USMC personnel, an Assistant PM 
(APM) Major and a civilian program analyst. All acquisition, contractual, testing, 
and test evaluation actions were under the PM-MTVR.  All logistics and logistics 
planning actions were under PM-CSLE. Matrix support for the MTVR Program 
was provided to PM-MTVR by members of the Army’s Tank-automotive and 
Armament Command (TACOM).  [Ref. 18] 
As the lead service, acting under the guidance of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)), 
who was the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the U.S. Marine Corps, 
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represented by COMMARCORSYSCOM, had the authority to direct the program 
under the policies and procedures set forth in Department of Defense (DoD) and 
the Department of the Navy (DoN) acquisition regulations. 
PM-MTVR was the Product Manager for the MTVR Program and 
reported to PEO-GCSS on all matters concerning the execution of this program. 
The U.S. Army, represented by PEO-GCSS, executed the program per the 
decisions and direction of COMMARCORSYSCOM and ASN (RDA). PEO-GCSS 
committed organic organizational resources and solicited appropriate support to 
execute contractual and program management activities.  All formal 
communications to potential contractors were directed through PEO-GCSS. [Ref. 
18]  
The Marine Corps was a full participating member of the MTVR 
Program Management team consisting of the PEO-GCSS, MARCORSYSCOM, 
PM-MTVR (including USMC personnel located in the PM) and the PM-CSLE. 
The Marine Corps was fully represented as a voting member on all committees, 
management teams, integrated product teams, source selection teams, and test 
working groups. [Ref. 19] 
COMMARCORSYSCOM was responsible for funding all 
reimbursable work performed by PEO-GCSS, any surge contract support, and 
TACOM matrix support elements in support of the MTVR Contract.  They were 
also responsible for providing all funding for the execution of the Research and 
Development contract and the production contract.  They also provided funding 
required for expenses associated with the execution of the fielding plan. [Ref. 19] 
d. Reassigned to PM Ground Support Integration 
PM-MTVR was reassigned from a separate Product Management 
Office when it was combined with PM Ground Systems Integration (GSI) under 
PEO-GCSS in October 1998.  PM GSI was the PM that offered Horizontal 
Technology Integration (HTI) across a wide platform of various PEO vehicles and 
systems that included the MIAI Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.  
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The two PM offices were combined because PM GSI had a large reduction in its 
programs and funding and, as a result, had excess experienced personnel that 
could assist PM MTVR as it was ramping up in its workload requirements.  PM 
GSI offered valuable acquisition, contractual, test and evaluation, and program 
support to the PM MTVR Program. 
When the U.S. Army terminated PM GSI on 30 September 2000, 
PM-MTVR re-emerged as a separate PM under PEO GCSS and would remain 
so until the program was officially transitioned to the Marine Corps in June 2001. 
[Ref. 17] 
e. PM-MTVR Awards and Recognition 
On 22 May 2000, at the Pentagon, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Jacques S. Gansler presented the PM-
MTVR Team with the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award. The 
Packard Award recognizes organizations, groups and teams that have 
demonstrated superior accomplishments that contribute significantly to best 
defense acquisition processes. [Ref. 20]  PEO-GCSS nominated PM MTVR for 
the Packard Award; the nomination was subjected to a rigorous competitive 
process, through the Department of the Army and then the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.  MTVR was selected based on the following criteria:  
• Reducing life-cycle costs: the MTVR Team avoided military-unique 
developments and acquisition costs by leveraging a non-
developmental item strategy and using commercial components. 
• Providing best value for the Government: the MTVR vehicle 
represents a low-risk integration effort of high-end commercial truck 
components. 
• Integrating defense with commercial base practices: the team 
infused the latest cost-effective commercial corrosion prevention 
and control technology into the MTVR to meet the USMC 
requirement of a vehicle lasting 22 years without mid-life rebuild 





• Promoting continuous improvement of the acquisition process: the 
team halved source selection time by integrating industry into the 
RFP development process.  It conducted developmental testing 
and operational assessments concurrently to cut follow-on 
operational testing and evaluation. 
• Accomplishing specific goals associated with acquisition reform 
initiatives: PM MTVR reduced source selection time for the phase II 
contract by including contractors in specification development. [Ref. 
20] 
The PM-MTVR Program was also awarded the Reduction of Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC) Award.  Dr. Jacques Gansler, USD (AT&L), presented 
the award to the MTVR Program in November 2000.  The award certificate read: 
As a special Pilot Program under the Reducing Total Ownership 
Cost (R-TOC) initiative, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
Program has distinguished itself as a leader in the Department of 
Defense drive to maintain and improve system readiness while 
reducing total system ownership costs.  The MTVR team has 
shown dedication and creativity in identifying new approaches to 
improve system readiness, maintainability, and supportability; 
reduce logistics cycle time; and implement competitive product 
support strategies. [Ref. 17] 
2. TACOM Matrix Support Organizations  
a. Acquisition Center 
Acquisition support for the MTVR Office was directly supported by 
the TACOM Acquisition Center.  The PM MTVR Office had one full-time 
procurement analyst assigned to the program.  Additional contracting support 
was provided by the TACOM Acquisition Center on an as-needed, reimbursable 
basis.  The acquisition center at TACOM was large and diversified, with a staff in 
excess of 500 acquisition professionals.  They had many years of experience in 
the acquisition of vehicles, both for the Army and for the other DoD services.  
This included acquisition support for the Marine Corps Logistics Support Vessel 
and Light Armored Vehicle Programs.  TACOM’s Acquisition Center offered the 
Marines the required support for the acquisition of their tracked and wheeled 
vehicles. [Ref. 2] 
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b. The Integrated Material Management Center (IMMC) 
IMMC provided integrated management maintenance, material 
management, readiness, manpower and personnel integration, logistics 
supportability analysis, and Foreign Military Sales support.  The Tactical Product 
Line Executive (PLE) Office provided logistical, supply, and maintenance 
engineering support to the tactical fleet, such as the MTVR and its users 
worldwide. [Ref. 2] 
c. Safety Office 
The Safety Office at TACOM was the command’s principal agent 
on work force, property, and worldwide TACOM-managed material safety.  The 
office’s goal was to provide the safest possible material to TACOM customers.  
MTVR did have agreements in place with the safety office to provide as-needed 
services on a reimbursable basis. [Ref. 2] 
The MTVR Safety IPT consisted of the MTVR Safety Manager, the 
TACOM Safety Officer, representatives from the MARCORSYSCOM Safety 
Office and OTC.  Objectives included ensuring safety considerations were 
consistent with MTVR mission requirements.  Historical safety data were 
provided in the development of specifications and test plans for the MTVR.  
Consideration was also given to system design, production, and fielding to 
safety, ease of disposal and demilitarization of any hazardous materials. [Ref. 21] 
d. TACOM Security Assistance Center (TSAC) 
Security covered both classified and unclassified facilities, system 
hardware and software, as well as documentation, which required protection and 
special handling procedures.  Unclassified technical software or hardware would 
be subject to restriction in terms of distribution based upon such reasons as 
“Foreign Information,” “Proprietary Equipment or Data,” or “Test and Evaluation.”  
The office that had provided these services to PM-MTVR was located at TACOM.   
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These services were provided on an as-required basis for intelligence-related 
matters and inquiries and paid for on a reimbursable basis by the Marine Corps.  
[Ref. 2] 
TSAC was TACOM’s link to the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA).  This agency promotes security cooperation programs as a 
means to strengthen defense relationships.  DCSA directs Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) and supports Direct Commercial Sales as the two main vehicles for the 
sale of defense articles and services to foreign governments and international 
organizations. [Ref. 2] 
3. USMC Acquisition Organizations 
a. MARCORSYSCOM  
Located at Quantico, VA, MARCORSYSCOM serves as the Marine 
Corps acquisition command to satisfy user requirements for the Corps. This 
command is a Headquarters, Marine Corps agency and is at the same reporting 
level as the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.  Headquarters, 
Marine Corps reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition.  It consists of multiple support 
organizations, including the Ground Transportation and Engineer Systems, 
Combat Equipment and Support Systems, Armor and Fire Support Systems, 
Infantry Weapon Systems, Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), Battlespace 
Management and Air Defense Systems and Information Systems & 
Infrastructure. [Ref. 22]   
Ground Transportation and Engineering Systems, Product Group 
15, consists of PM Engineers, PM Motor Transport, PM Power, and PM 
Transportability.  PM Motor Transport is broken down among the three fleets of 
light, medium, and heavy trucks.  The Marine Corps Light Fleet includes vehicles 
for payloads up to two tons and consists of HMMWVs, Motorcycles, Interim Fast 
Attack Vehicle (IFAV), and the Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV).  The 
Medium Fleet consists of vehicles intended for off-road payloads up to seven 
tons and 15 tons for hard-surface roads and includes the MTVR and five-ton 
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truck fleets.  The Heavy Fleet vehicles are intended for payloads of up to 12 tons 
off-road and up to 22 tons on hard-surface roads and include the Logistics 
Vehicle System and its eventual replacement, the LVS-R. [Refs. 15, 22]  
b.  USMC Acquisition Center-Quantico, VA  
This is the center of the Marine Corps acquisition programs.  It is 
located within Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico at Hospital Point, a four-
building complex.  It opened in October 2000 and is home to the various PMs 
that constitute MARCORSYSCOM.  A central goal of the Marine Corps was to 
create a “center of acquisition excellence” at Quantico where a variety of Marine 
Corps acquisition programs would be centered, now including the MTVR 
Program.  By establishing core personnel positions at Quantico for this effort, the 
Marines took the lead in providing an acquisition center for their unique program 
needs. 
This was demonstrated with the transition of the MTVR Program 
from the Army to the Marine Corps.  It is also being demonstrated with the 
Marine Corps newest acquisition program, the Logistics Vehicle System 
Replacement (LVSR).  The LVSR is a heavy tactical transport vehicle for bulk 
liquids, ammunition, ISO containers up to 20 feet in length, tactical bridges, and 
bulk cargo.  This planned future vehicle will also perform wrecker and recovery 
duties and tow semi-trailers carrying heavy-oversized equipment. [Ref. 22] 
4. Future Cooperative Acquisition Efforts  
Future cooperative U.S. Army and Marine Corps acquisition efforts include 
the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) and the next-generation Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV).  This will replace the existing 
tank and armored troop carriers. [Ref. 23] 
The FCS is a system of systems that will include high-technology 
command, control and sensor systems; unmanned aerial vehicles; and futuristic 
long range guns and missile launchers that might be incorporated into a Marine-
specific vehicle, yet to be determined. The Army envisions a variety of vehicles 
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as part of the FCS program, including an infantry carrier vehicle, reconnaissance 
vehicle, medical vehicle, mortar vehicle and missile-launching vehicle, among 
others. [Ref. 23] 
This effort is significant because it means that the Corps will cooperate 
and gain knowledge from the Future Combat System, one of the most ambitious 
vehicle replacement programs in Army history.  As Col. Len Blaisol, head of 
material requirements for Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
Quantico, VA, stated:  
This is a major undertaking for us, no doubt about it.  It’s going to 
see us applying a lot of resources to this challenge.  It’s the Marine 
Corps’ way—it’s everybody’s way—to try and leverage off of the 
activity that other people have done.  We knew the Army was 
developing FCS, and we knew that . . . would create a lot of 
opportunities for us to observe what they were doing and to use the 
technologies that they had developed.  
One of the major differences between the two programs is their respective 
schedules.  The Army plans to begin fielding the FCS in 2008, while the Marine 
Corps MEFFV is not expected to join the fleet until 2024.  The concept of 
operations is different also between that of the Army and Marine Corps. [Ref. 23] 
Unlike the Army, the Marines do not have to design a ground force to fight 
an extended continental ground war.  A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) made 
up of about 2,000 Marines usually stays in the theatre for 90 days or less before 
it runs out of supplies.  The Marines are not equipped for a long, sustained 
operation.  Marine vehicles are likely to have different weight and size 
requirements than the Army’s because the Marines have to fit an entire MEU in 
the three ships that typically deploy with an amphibious ready group.  The FCS 
would never fit on a three-ship Armed Reconnaissance Group (ARG). 
The dissimilarities notwithstanding, both the Army and the Marine Corps 
will be building combat vehicles of sorts, so there is plenty of new technology that 
can be shared.  An example of common components that might serve as a model 
for FCS was pioneered in the Joint Strike Fighter program.  Although each 
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service required a different mission, 75 to 80 percent of the design is the same. 
By sharing common components, all stakeholders realized significant savings. 
[Ref. 23] 
Another joint services acquisition effort currently underway is the High 
Speed Vessel (HSV)-1, a joint effort of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and the Marine 
Corps.  The name of the vessel itself—“Joint Venture”—reflects its intended joint 
support.  The HSV-1 is an experimental, high-speed vessel capable of speeds of 
36 knots (operational) and 48 knots (lightship). The Australian-built, 313-foot, 
wave-piercing catamaran has been fitted with a helicopter pad and other military-
specific modifications.  A two-part hydraulically-operated ramp allows rapid 
loading and unloading of vehicles and troops from the stern or side of the vessel.  
[Ref. 24] 
The HSV-1 is intended to offer higher load capacity than an airplane, but 
at a much faster speed than the Army’s current types of large, ocean-going 
landing craft.  These vessels will eventually replace the U.S. Army’s current fleet 
of General Frank S. Besson, Jr.-class Logistics Support Vessels.  [Ref. 25] 
The project’s partners are exploring the operational implications and 
warfare opportunities of procuring a modified version of this commercially-
available marine technology. Lessons learned to date from this joint service 
acquisition effort have proven invaluable towards defining future Theatre Support 
Vessel requirements.  The HSV-1 is currently under U.S. Army purview. [Ref. 24]  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II provided a detailed history of joint and multi-service Army and 
Marine Corps Tactical Wheeled Programs and highlighted two that the Army 
manages for the Marine Corps. Included as well was a detailed historical review 
of the Marine Corps MTVR Program, along with a system description. The 
chapter further discussed how the MTVR Program Office was supported by both  
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the Army at Warren and the Marine Corps at Quantico and their various matrix 
organizations. Lastly, Chapter II introduced possible future joint DoD programs 
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III. ARMY/MARINE CORPS MULTI-SERVICE TWV 
ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
This chapter will examine MTVR Transition from Army Acquisition to 
Marine Corps, from various perspectives: first, from Marine Corps planning 
documents; second from the vantage point of Marine Corps liaison personnel; 
third, from the viewpoints of former Army Product Managers; fourth, from the 
view of the Oshkosh Truck Corporation, the contractor; and finally, from 
questionnaires that provide the perspective of various stakeholder personnel in 
Army, Marine Corps, and contractor positions. 
A. MTVR TRANSITION FROM ARMY TO USMC: THE PLAN 
1. Rationale 
The MTVR transition supported the overall Marine Corps objective of 
consolidating USMC acquisitions under MARCORSYSCOM program 
management.  As the Army had withdrawn from the harmonized program, the 
Army PM-MTVR was left managing a Marine Corps unique system, complicating 
the acquisition by placing Army management and contracting between the 
Marines and the MTVR contractor. 
2. Goals and Challenges 
The overall goals of the transition were:  to maintain the current schedule; 
to achieve quality; to achieve continuity; and to gain engineering expertise and 
experience with production.  Several factors posed significant challenges to the 
planned transition, including: loss of cost and pricing expertise; loss of Science & 
Technology (S&T) access; loss of experienced matrix support; discontinuity in 
the “Commanders’ Intent”; various impacts on the contractor; and potential future 





3.   Schedule 
Brigadier General Feigley, Commander MARCORSYSCOM, initiated a 
study effort that would eventually lead the expansion of MARCORSYSCOM into 
a center for acquisition excellence that would include current and future truck 
programs. On 23 March 1999, BG Feigley directed the Director, Combat and 
Support and Logistics Systems to conduct a study to relocate all technical and 
management efforts from PM-MTVR, PEO-GCSS to APM CSLE-MT, Quantico, 
VA. CSLE was tasked to establish alternatives using a collaborative process to 
analyze, weight, and rank order each alternative. The collaboration was 
conducted on 27 May 1999, and seven options were evaluated. [Ref. 26] (see 
Appendix D) 
The options to be compared were as follows: 
• Move the current PM-MTVR Program Office immediately to 
Quantico, VA. 
• Move to Quantico, VA after Milestone III. 
• Leave the program office in place at the current TACOM location. 
• Move the PM-MTVR Office under the current PM-Family of Medium 
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) also located at TACOM. 
• Move PM-MTVR Office under the current PM-Light Armored 
Vehicle (LAV) also located at TACOM. 
• Move PM-MTVR Office under the current PM-Heavy Tactical 
Vehicle (HTV) also located at TACOM. 
• Co-locate with Oshkosh Truck Corporation at Oshkosh, WI. 
The Marine Corps evaluated these seven options in accordance with their 
prerogatives as stated in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 
1998 between the Commander, Marine Corps System Command and the 
Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat and Support Systems. The Marine 
Corps had the authority to direct the program under the policies and procedures 
set forth in DoD and Department of the Navy acquisition regulations.  The Marine 
Corps was the lead agency per the terms of this MOA. Relocation options did 
include several that were not entirely within the control of the Marine Corps, such 
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as transitioning the office to OTC or placing it within existing TACOM PM Offices 
such as the FMTV.  The respective parties would have had to negotiate these 
relocations.      
The seven options were ranked as follows:    
• Leave the current PM-MTVR Office as it presently stands. 
• Move PM-MTVR under the current PM-FMTV Office. 
• Move PM-MTVR to Quantico after Milestone III. 
• Move PM-MTVR under PM-HTV. 
• Move PM-MTVR under PM-LAV. 
• Co-locate with Oshkosh Truck Corporation. 
• Move PM-MTVR to Quantico immediately. 
On 12 July 1999, BG Feigley received a decision paper that 
recommended the option to move the PM function to Quantico after Milestone III.  
This alternative met most of the criteria, including BG Feigley’s intent to 
consolidate acquisition management at MARCORSYSCOM.  The final decision 
was to accept the recommendation to relocate the MTVR office to 
MARCORSYSCOM in Quantico just after Milestone III. Due to a schedule slip to 
complete further operational testing, the Milestone III Decision was delayed from 
December 2000 to April 2001 and the official transition for the Program Office 
was set for 30 June 2001.  The Marine Corps planned to be fully staffed and 
ready to assume the execution of the program by that date.  [Ref. 26] 
The decision to move the MTVR program management to Quantico was 
not a reflection of Marine Corps dissatisfaction with Army management.  The 
Marines were extremely satisfied with the Army’s performance.  However, the 
long-range Marine Corps strategy was to centrally locate various USMC 
acquisition programs in Quantico The alternative chosen by the Marine Corps 
was deemed the only acceptable alternative to meet BG Feigley’s intent of 
consolidating acquisition management at MARCORSYSCOM.  
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There were a multitude of issues regarding the upcoming plan to transition 
the MTVR Program from the Army at TACOM to the USMC at Quantico. Among 
these were: 
• Congressional interest in the de-consolidation of systems in DoD 
acquisition. 
• Hiring and training a new Program Office. 
• Loss of co-located, wheeled vehicle experts in the PEO-GCSS and 
TACOM. 
• Loss of historical perspective of program issues in each of the 
functional areas transferred. 
• Close out of multiple financial and supply systems. 
• Program costs to hire PMO office personnel to replace those co-
located at TACOM. 
In addition, Oshkosh Truck expressed concerns, including:  1) uncertainty 
due to the transition that would increase their financial risk; 2) disputes that might 
arise that would increase program costs; 3) complexities and lack of precedent 
for transferring the existing Oshkosh Truck Corporation contracts with TACOM to 
a Marine Corps contracting activity. [Ref. 26] 
Several factors had an impact on the planned transition.  Far and away 
the biggest and most important factor was the MTVR’s program schedule. In 
terms of the program’s schedule, various factors and milestones were 
considered.  These included Milestone III preparation on First Article test, trailer, 
and variant effort impacts and award of the CSLE Service Support contract and 
its eventual transition.  
Manpower factors included the manpower pool available at Quantico and 
the learning curve required for the transition of the program. Additional factors 
included MARCORSYSCOM organizational flexibility to manage the 
automotive/truck commodity. 
An additional factor included costs issues that would create Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) impacts. Cost factors included the cost of a 
possible schedule delay due to the transition, as well as additional contract costs.  
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The transition of the MTVR Product Office from the U.S. Army to the Marine 
Corps required the transfer of the Army’s MTVR contracts with Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation to the Marines.  These costs had to be estimated and figured into the 
total costs of the transition.  Additional cost considerations included the cost of 
sharing and leveraging required support personnel at Quantico for the MTVR 
Program, as well as possible relocation costs for any personnel relocating 
geographically with the program. [Ref. 26] 
Contract factors included the impact and the legal issues of changing 
procurement contracting officer responsibilities and functions from the U.S. Army 
to the Marine Corps.  Possibly new contracts might be needed and certainly new 
procuring contracting officers must be assigned.  Another factor to be considered 
was the impact on the prime contractor, Oshkosh Truck Corporation.  The U.S. 
Army had a proven track record in various truck acquisition programs extending 
over a long period of time.  What type of relationship would develop with the 
Marine Corps?  What about possible impacts on the numerous sub-contractors 
involved with the program? 
Strategic decision factors included the future working relationship between 
the Marine Corps and TACOM in particular.  The TACOM community was 
considered the expert, the “Cadillac” in terms of its extensive knowledge and 
experience in truck acquisition programs.  Could it still be counted on to provide 
this information and expertise to the MTVR Program and additional Marine Corps 
acquisition programs?  Additional strategic considerations included logistics 
support and the MARCORSYSCOM relationship with MCLB Albany.  With the 
loss of TACOM logistics matrix support in the program transition, would the 
Marine Corps be able to provide adequate logistical support through MCLB 
Albany? 
Program Management factors that were considered included impact of 
personnel on existing In-Process Teams (IPT).  With the potential loss of team 
members in the transition, what impact would this have on IPT continuity and 
decision making ability?  Additional factors included personnel morale and 
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program leadership.  Another major consideration was the impact of having a 
centralized vs. a decentralized project office.  Is it easier to manage an entire PM 
from one location?  What effect would office dispersion have on the program? 
Program factors affecting the politics of the transition were also 
considered.  These included Congressional political considerations, such as 
removing from TACOM its role as the tank-automotive developer and acquirer for 
the various DoD services.  TACOM had an excellent reputation in executing 
current Marine Corps programs, such as the Light Armored Vehicle, so why 
change now?  Why not let TACOM execute the MTVR Program?  Why upset 
critically important Congressional support for DoD acquisition programs? [Ref. 
26] 
One final factor in the collaborative process had to do with facilities and 
their impact on the transition.  TACOM offered available space to the current PM-
MTVR Product Office along with its broad matrix support organizations.  This 
support also included computer equipment and software.  Consideration had to 
be given to the lack of current office space at MCB Quantico for the PM Office, 
as well as to new office facilities at Hospital Point MCB Quantico. [Ref. 26] 
The overall priorities of the transition were as follows: 
• Maintaining the current schedule 
• Achieving Quality 
• Maintaining Continuity 
• Engineering Expertise 
• Experience with major production program 
(See Appendix D for the detailed transition plan and collaboration scoring 
results) 
In conjunction with the collaboration, and in preparation for the MTVR 
transition to Quantico, an MTVR Transition Steering Committee was established 
in November 1999.  The steering committee consisted of:  PM, Transportation  
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Systems, CSLE, MARCORSYSCOM; Medium Fleet Project Officer (APM), 
CSLE, MARCORSYSCOM; PM-MTVR, PEO-GCSS (resident at TACOM); and 
Deputy PM-MTVR, PEO-GCSS (resident at TACOM). [Ref. 19] 
This Steering Committee acted on the recommendations of the MTVR 
Transition IPT comprised of the following: PM-MTVR, PEO GCSS and selected 
TACOM personnel, along with their MARCORSYSCOM counterparts: Chief 
Engineer, Chief of Logistics, Test and Evaluation Officer, Procuring Contracting 
Officer, Legal Representative, Budget Analyst, and Quality Assurance 
Representative. 
Various phases for this committee were established, with Phase 0 
originating in November 1999.  The committee was tasked with identifying: 1) 
total transition cost; 2) contract implications; 3) required funds and their 
availability; 4) required MARCORSYSCOM Government personnel; 5) 
MARCORSYSCOM required contractor personnel; and 6) commitments 
associated with staffing actions synchronized to specific dates. [Ref. 19] 
This was followed by Phase I, which began in June 2000.  The committee 
was tasked with beginning the “incremental stand up of minimal essential Core 
Team,” including the MTVR Team at MCB Quantico and MCLB Albany, GA.  It 
also was charged with establishing a working interface with PM MTVR, PEO-
GCSS counterparts.  Estimated completion date of Phase I was set for 
December 2000. 
Phase II was set to begin in January 2001.  During this phase, personnel 
within PEO-GCSS and TACOM continued to manage the MTVR acquisition, but 
designated personnel at MARCORSYSCOM holding tenure for six-months or 
more assumed a deputy role.  Phase II was planned to be completed by April 
2001. 
The final phase, Phase III, had PEO-GCSS withdrawing its PM-MTVR 
team beginning in April 2001, to be completed by October 2001.  This marked 
the planned end of Army personnel working on the MTVR program. [Ref. 19]   
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The transition planning for the MTVR called for the relocation of the MTVR 
office to COMMARCORSYSCOM in Quantico, VA shortly after Milestone III. The 
Milestone III Acquisition Decision Memorandum was signed on 12 April 2001. 
Consistent with that event, the Production Year Three contract with Oshkosh 
Truck Corporation initiating full-rate production for the MTVR, was signed 13 April 
2001.  The MTVR Material Release was approved on 27 April 2001. [Ref. 17] 
The official transition for the MTVR Program Office occurred on 30 June 
2001. The Marine Corps expected to be fully staffed by that time and ready to 
take over the execution of the program.  In preparation for this transition, the 
MTVR Base Contract was transferred to USMC MARCORSYSCOM on 31 May 
2001.  The MTVR Variant Contract was transferred 6 June 2001. [Ref. 19] 
4. Analysis of the Transition 
The Marine Corps conducted a detailed collaboration in May 1999. It 
examined seven possible options to the eventual location of their Program Office. 
These options ranged from leaving the current program office in place at TACOM 
to moving to Quantico or even to Oshkosh Truck Corporation.  Factors most 
relevant to the Marine Corps and the MTVR were examined. [Ref. 26] 
The conclusion drawn from the Marine Corps’s own report was that 
leaving the Program Office at TACOM, PEO-GCSS, with its existing matrix 
support organization in place, was the highest scoring choice.  This choice was 
the least disruptive to schedule, cost, and performance. (See Appendix D, slide 
8, page 9)  The weighted average score of 8.99 far exceeded the next best 
choice of also leaving the PM office at TACOM under the PM-FMTV Program 
Office (6.53), which came in slightly ahead of the third choice of moving the PM 
Office to Quantico after Milestone III (6.51). However, all three of these choices 
were above the threshold of the minimally acceptable 5.5 score required to avoid 
negative program impacts. 
These three choices, along with a fourth—leaving the MTVR Product 
Office at TACOM and moving it under the PM-LAV Office—were deemed 
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“acceptable” to the Marine Corps under their collaborative parameters. They 
based this “acceptability” on the most important factor to be considered in any 
planned relocation—the program’s schedule—and weighted this factor 
accordingly. The seven additional factors that were considered and weighted 
accordingly were manpower, cost, contracts, strategic decisions, program 
management, politics, and facilities. [Ref. 26] 
Each of the four acceptable relocation choices had one or more negatives.  
The first choice—leaving the PM Office as it now stood—was the least 
disruptive to the program schedule and the additional seven program impact 
factors.  The negative impact was that it would not fulfill the Marine Corps 
requirement to relocate the PM Office to Quantico. [Ref. 26] 
The second acceptable relocation choice was leaving the PM Office at 
TACOM under FMTV.  Moving PM-MTVR under FMTV had the same technical 
and management advantages as leaving the office under the PEO, except for 
adding another management layer. The same people working on the program 
now would continue to work the program under this alternative.  However, this 
alternative was unacceptable to the Marine Corps since it would have put the 
MTVR program under the PM of a then "failing, or perceived failing, program.”  
The MTVR at one point had been placed under PM-FMTV with disastrous results 
and, although there has been a PM change in FMTV, there were no assurances 
that personnel assigned to the MTVR program would not have been diverted to 
support the FMTV at the expense of the MTVR. [Ref. 26] 
The acceptable relocation choice rated fourth was leaving the PM Office at 
TACOM, but placing it under PM Heavy Tactical Vehicles.  This would have 
placed the MTVR Project Office in with the management of similar vehicles and 
with a common contractor, Oshkosh Truck Corporation.  It would have provided 
PM-MTVR with a common TACOM matrix support organization, but possibly not 
the same people who had worked on the program before.  However, the Marine 
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Corps felt that its Product Office would lose program visibility working within 
another U.S. Army Product Office.  
The Marine Corps, therefore, decided that in order to satisfy the 
Commander’s requirement to create a center of acquisition excellence at MCB 
Quantico, Virginia, their “best” choice would be “acceptable relocation choice 
number three”—moving the program office to Quantico after Milestone III.  The 
Corps felt that transitioning the program after Milestone III would allow time for 
the program to stabilize and provide sufficient time to plan, organize, hire, and 
train the required personnel to execute their program. [Ref. 26] 
Several interviews with Program officials highlighted the problem of the 
timing of the transition.  U.S. Army program officials felt that the transition came 
too soon after the program received Milestone III approval, whereas the Marines 
thought that it was the opportune time for the transition.  Questionnaire 
responses on the subject clearly showed that all respondents, including the 
Marines, thought that the Corps was not fully prepared for the transition. They did 
not have the proper level of support to staff this new PM office adequately. [Ref. 
27] 
5.  Transition Advantages 
Transitioning the Program Office to Quantico satisfied the Marine Corps 
requirement to form a “center of acquisition excellence” within Hospital Point at 
MCB Quantico.  The MTVR Program Office joined the other Marine Corps PMs 
at a central acquisition center, where each could share program and acquisition 
experience from within the Marine Corps itself.  Up until that point in time, many 
of the Marine Corps’ acquisition programs were based on other services’ 
concepts and designs, and many were largely managed by the other services, as 
we have seen in its LVS and LAV programs being managed by the U. S. Army at 
TACOM.  In fact, by developing the acquisition center at Hospital Point MCB 
Quantico, the Marines were able to centralize nearly all their PMs within a four- 
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building radius at Quantico.  Prior to this, the programs that the Marine Corps 
was managing in-house were scattered all across Quantico, an arrangement that 
had not been conducive to centralizing their acquisition base. [Ref. 11] 
One new Marine Corps acquisition center program that clearly 
demonstrates the commitment of the Corps to having a “center of acquisition 
excellence” was the planned MTVR Trailer acquisition program. A total of 5,248 
MTVR’S had been fielded as of 21 May 2004.  The MTVR Product Office has 
initiated a new acquisition program of MTVR trailers.  At present, the MTVR 
Truck is still utilizing a variety of trailers left over from the days of the original five-
ton truck the MTVR is replacing.  The MTVR-Trailer program is an initiative to 
replace the current M105 Cargo Trailer, M149 Water Buffalo, and the M353 
General Purpose Trailer.  The new trailers will be capable of augmenting the 
MTVR’s increased mobility without degrading its operational capabilities.  This 
program will develop and field trailers with greater mobility characteristics, while 
maximizing the commonality of parts across the three trailer platforms. [Ref. 28] 
6. Transition Challenges 
The Marine Corps, by creating a new center of acquisition excellence, also 
has created new challenges. It must meet these challenges in order to achieve 
true acquisition excellence.  The Corps must create a pool of talented acquisition 
professionals who can meet the managerial and technical demands of a 
Program/Product Office. Like their counterparts whom they are leaving behind at 
TACOM, the Marines must start to build the years of knowledge and experience 
required for truck acquisition programs. 
Manpower.  As was clearly stated in the responses to my questionnaire, 
even from the Marines themselves, the Marine Corps simply was not as ready for 
the MTVR Project Office transition as it could have been.  The dedicated 
personnel required to staff a PM office were not in place. This area of concern is 
discussed in later sections, including the questionnaire findings. 
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Contracting Issues.  One major concern that arose during the MTVR 
transition involved the existing contracts between the U.S. Army TACOM and 
Oshkosh Truck Corporation.  Transferring the contracts from the Army to the 
Marines, though legally possible, was very complex.  Up until the MTVR 
transition, a contract transfer between the services was “unfamiliar territory.”  The 
contract had to remain in effect.  OTC had to have a contract on hand at all 
times, and two contracts covering the identical requirements, even with different 
services involved, cannot exist at the same time.  The MTVR Production 
Contracts with Oshkosh Truck Corporation was successfully transitioned from 
TACOM to the MARCORSYSCOM on 31 May 2001 and 6 June 2001. [Refs. 11, 
19] 
While transitioning the MTVR Program from the U.S. Army at TACOM, the 
Marine Corps initially established a separate PM Office at Quantico for MTVR in 
June 2001.  This PM Office merged in October 2002 with PM Transportation to 
form PM Motor Transport. [Ref. 11]  By establishing an operational Product 
Office at Quantico, the Marine Corps with the Army’s cooperation had to continue 
to provide a positive environment where both service could draw upon the other 
for expertise and advice on this and future program issues.  Each service had 
something to offer the other.  The transition had to be accomplished in such a 
way that only positive feelings and attitudes would be established and left behind.  
Future DoD vehicle programs will depend on this cooperative working 
relationship.  
As part of this transition, the Marine Corps not only faced the 
establishment of an acquisition center at Quantico, but it also faced the need to 
expand its logistics activity at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA.  The 
Marines had been heavily involved on the logistics side since the inception of the 
MTVR program.  However, matrixed TACOM logistics personnel provided the 
bulk of the logistics support prior to the MTVR transition due to their extensive 
experience in truck-related programs. 
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Multi-service or joint programs will encounter many challenges in the area 
of logistics due to the variety of logistic support structures of the various services.  
Logistic supportability must be accomplished in a manner that all support 
requirements are adequately considered, planned, and budgeted from the 
beginning of the acquisition process. Logistics management objectives of multi-
service or joint programs are the efficient performance of Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) planning, analysis and documentations to satisfy essential needs 
of each of the participating services, and the achievement of established 
readiness and supportability objectives. [Ref. 29]    
By assuming direct management of many of its acquisition programs, the 
Marine Corps has reduced day-to-day communication with the Army for sharing 
technical expertise, management approaches, revolutionary ideas for future 
systems, and common solutions to similar operational challenges.  Although 
there will be future joint programs between the Army and the Marine Corps, new 
bridges will have to be built to replace past cooperative arrangements.  
B. USMC PERSPECTIVE 
1. MARCORSYSCOM Project Officer Interviews 
a. Major Lee Morton, USMC Project Officer for MTVR from 
December 1999 to October 2002 
In an interview held in October 2000, Major Lee Morton, USMC 
Project Officer for the MTVR Program, discussed the MTVR accomplishments 
and challenges.  These accomplishments, included the signing of the MTVR 
Variant contract with OTC, as well as having the program overall on schedule 
and, in a few areas, ahead of schedule. [Ref. 30] 
Major Morton indicated that the most pressing challenge was the 
delay of the Milestone III decision.  He stated that the MCOTEA report indicating 
that the MTVR was “Operationally Effective, but not Operationally Suitable” was 
not unexpected; however, he was surprised with the overall ratings.  As a result 
of the report, the Marines decided to extend the Operational Test on the MTVR in 
an attempt to improve upon the operational performance.   
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Major Morton also discussed the difficulties and risks associated 
with running concurrent developmental and operational tests in an attempt to 
implement acquisition streamlining reforms.  Major Morton also pointed out that 
the delay in the Milestone III decision was the direct result of trying to run 
operational testing concurrently with developmental testing, an acquisition reform 
initiative.  This left no time to correct deficiencies that were uncovered during DT 
and incorporate these changes into the MTVR prior to the start of OT. He further 
commented that the schedule delay was also indirectly compounded by the 
change in presidential administration in Washington D.C., with its typical delays 
in completing new appointments to various key DoD positions, among them the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for the MTVR.   
Major Morton also discussed the then upcoming transition of the 
program to the Marine Corps and stated that the Marines were simply not as 
ready as they could be.  This was due to administrative delays, such as the delay 
in recruiting for such key positions as a procurement officer and quality 
assurance personnel.  However, the transition did take place on 30 June 2001.   
In dealings with OTC, Major Morton stated that the contractors had 
done a “real good job.”  From his point of view, OTC treated the Marine Corps as 
a full business partner in the development and manufacture of the MTVR system.  
The Marines were considered an OTC customer and were treated as such.  
Many revisions were requested and implemented on the MTVR, and OTC 
performed in keeping with the good faith that exists between OTC and the Marine 
Corps, even in the absence of supporting contract language. [Ref. 30] 
The biggest challenge to the MTVR program, Morton said, was that 
the partners were geographically dispersed.  “But [with] frequent phone calls, e-
mails, and the video teleconferences, combined with everybody wanting to do 
what’s best for the program, we were able to make things work.”  Morton went on 
to say that the Army provided outstanding support via PEO-GCSS and TACOM.   
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“Both the Marines and the Army worked closely together with 
Oshkosh to ensure the MTVR would meet the Marine Corps’ demanding 
requirements,” Morton said.  “The Army’s PM MTVR Office has supported the 
program as if it were their own.  Their assistance in contract and production 
management has been top-notch.  We know the Marine Corps couldn’t have 
gotten this far without the Army’s support.” [Ref. 30] 
b. Mr. Dennis Haag, USMC Liaison Officer to USATACOM 
from June 1993 to August 1997, Science Applications 
International Corporation MTVR Contractor August 1997 
to May 2000 
I interviewed Mr. Dennis Haag, current PEO-CS&CSS G3/G4, on 
28 May 04 at TACOM.  Mr. Haag is a retired Marine Corps Major who served as 
the liaison officer at TACOM, serving in PM-MTTR and completing his tour of 
duty in PM-MTVR prior to his retirement.  He continued to work in the PM MTVR 
Product Office for another two years as a contract employee with Science 
Application International Corporation, assisting with the program’s logistics. [Ref. 
31] 
Mr. Haag touched on the history of the MTVR Truck, stressing the 
historical development of the MTVR Truck and why the Marine Corps required a 
new truck as opposed to rebuilding its existing five-ton truck fleet.  Oshkosh 
Truck Corporation proved to the Marines that in order to meet the requirements 
specified, it would be cheaper in the long run to develop and build a new truck. 
These requirements included being able to travel and perform in difficult terrain; 
being able to transport minimum weight requirements; and being able to tow the 
M198 Howitzer.  The truck had to be C-130 transportable and able to be air lifted 
by the Marine Corps CH-53 E Helicopter. 
Mr. Haag discussed his impression, and that of the Marine Corps, 
of having the U.S. Army execute the MTVR Program at the outset.  He stated 
that, due to the limited size of the Marine Corps acquisition center, the Marines 
would never have gotten the required paperwork through in order to start the 
MTVR acquisition program.  The U.S. Army had the right mix of people and the 
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experience required to get the program moving.  He also stated that the PMO 
and TACOM put the right standards in for the Marines’ new truck.  The Marine 
Corps itself historically funded its truck programs at levels below that of its 
combat vehicles, such as the LAV.  Obtaining required funding levels for its truck 
programs was risky, with only certain “windows of opportunity” available. When 
funding did become available, the Marines moved to make it happen quickly. 
The Marines lacked the staff at MCB Quantico to stand up a new 
PM Office.  The Marine Corps and the U.S. Army had already been executing a 
joint program at TACOM under PM-MTTR.  This office was largely staffed by 
U.S. Army personnel, along with a couple of Marine Corps liaison officers.  The 
Army terminated its portion of the program, so their staff became available for the 
new PM-MTVR Product Office. The Marines had an opportunity to make use of 
the TACOM PM-MTTR Product Office and its staff to initiate the MTVR Program. 
The Marines have historically exercised fiscal restraint by using “economies of 
buying”—i.e., let others buy it first, and then “jump in” to purchase it after it has 
already been developed and tested.  In this case, they were jumping into an 
existing PM Office to share economies of scale.    
Mr. Haag stated that the Marines had an excellent impression of 
the Army’s handling of the MTVR Program.  They were “well pleased,” had a 
good relationship with the Army, and, above all, had complete “trust” in the 
Army’s handling of their program. The Marines also were well pleased in their 
dealings with Oshkosh Truck Corporation.  OTC, the U.S. Army, and the Marine 
Corps exercised “true partnering” and, as a result, produced a good product, the 
MTVR Truck. [Ref. 31] 
2. Marine Corps Viewpoint 
When it comes to multi-service or joint programs, the Marine Corps has 
been a willing participant for many years attaching their acquisitions to TACOM 
and associated PEOs for trucks and combat vehicles.  The philosophy of the 
Marines to exercise fiscal restraint by using “economies of buying”—i.e., let 
others buy it first, and then jump in to purchase it—has clearly been 
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demonstrated by the Corps’ acquisition programs for many years.  The Army has 
successfully supported or managed the Marines LAV and LVS Product Offices at 
TACOM for over 20 years.    
As documented in the interviews with senior Marine Corps MTVR Product 
Office personnel and in the responses to my questionnaire (see Appendix K for 
complete questionnaire), the Marine Corps respondents were very satisfied with 
the MTVR and the multi-service Army/Marine Corps product office that managed 
it.  Not withstanding the temporary setback of the MCOTEA operation test report, 
the MTVR Product Office produced for the Marines a vehicle that, from every 
account, is successful.  As one respondent stated, “The Marines got their 
program dollar’s worth in the MTVR.”  Another stated, “Overall, the perception is 
that the truck is a new awesome capability.” 
C.  U.S.  ARMY PERSPECTIVE 
1. Army Product Manager Interviews  
a. LTC George Schneller, Product Manager for the MTVR 
from September 1996 to July 1999 
In December 2000, I interviewed LTC George Schneller, the former 
Product Manager for PM-MTTR.  LTC Schneller was the Product Manager 
immediately preceding LTC Walter Raymond. LTC Schneller discussed the 
advantages of having a joint or multi-service Product Office shared by the Army 
and the Marine Corps.  He stated that, for the Army, it had provided an 
opportunity for the office to keep going, especially after the completion of the 
ESP Program and the subsequent transition of that program from the PEO to 
TACOM.  He also felt that if the Army should ever decide to change course and 
purchase the MTVR Truck, they would be ready to go. [Ref. 32] 
There are additional advantages, as well, in having a joint Product 
Office.  Each of the services can share in the costs and reap the benefits of 
combining their requirements into a joint Product Office.  Savings occur through 
the use of joint designs, testing, quality assurance, scheduling, and production.   
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LTC Schneller went on to state that he felt the Marine Corps 
definitely benefited “big time” in the current arrangement of a joint Product Office.  
Its program was able to leverage the truck knowledge base that existed at 
TACOM.  It also gained the expertise of the automotive industry in the Detroit 
area.  The PEO structure that PM-MTVR operated under provided the key 
leadership over the program that was especially critical in the early days of the 
program.  The Project Office was already set up and ready to go.  The Marines 
also benefited from TACOM’s acquisition know-how and the use of the 
acquisition center to place a contract for the MTVR.  The Corps also was able to 
use TACOM’s legal expertise, its safety office, and the infrastructure that having 
a multi-service office at TACOM had to offer. 
A major contribution that came from earlier experience in Army-
managed programs was the valuable knowledge of how to manage the corrosion 
prevention/control program.  The FMTV Program Office started this effort, built 
on it, and accelerated the testing that eventually led to the industry’s standard 22-
year corrosion requirement now required in DoD vehicles. [Ref. 32] 
b. LTC Walt Raymond, Product Manager for the MTVR from 
July 1999 to June 2001 
I interviewed LTC Walt Raymond in December 2000.  He recalled 
the major program accomplishments he had seen.  The first accomplishment he 
cited was the 17 January 2000 MTVR rollout ceremony at Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation, attended by various corporate and Government officials.  Other 
accomplishments included successful completion of the first article test and the 
production verification test. [Ref. 17] 
In dealing with the Marine Corps, LTC Raymond stated that the 
Marines stressed at every point that “this was a Marine Corps program funded 
with Marine Corps dollars.”  While the contract was between OTC and the U.S. 
Army, all efforts were on behalf of the Marine Corps.  As such, this program 
presented him with an unusual operating arrangement.   
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Regarding relationships with the contractor, OTC, LTC Raymond 
noted that they were of outstanding character, team players, and a company very 
much committed to the concept of teaming.  They made an honest attempt to 
accommodate the Marine Corps and the Army demands, as well as their own 
unique reporting requirements.   
Like nearly all programs, the MTVR had its challenges, as well.  In 
an attempt to reduce the program schedule, the Developmental and Operational 
testing programs were combined.  A problem arose when the Marine Corps’ 
operational evaluation agency determined that the MTVR was Operationally 
Effective, but not Operationally Suitable.  In order to meet the Milestone III 
Decision, this would have to be (and eventually was) overcome. 
The major disappointment for the program (at the time of this 
interview) was the lack of a Milestone III decision.  Despite the good intentions of 
implementing schedule reduction, having a combined Developmental and 
Operational test program had created problems.  [Milestone III Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum was signed 12 April 2001, about six months after this 
interview.]   
The Marine Corps’ acquisition team required to be ready and fully 
operational by 1 July 2001 did not meet that date.  The recruiting effort for the 
varied acquisition positions needed to support the transition was behind schedule 
and the team was not available.  Valuable transition time between the Army and 
Marine Corps PM organizations had been lost. [Ref. 17] 
I conducted a follow-up interview with LTC (USA, Ret.),  Raymond 
on 27 May 2004, held at TACOM.  Mr. Raymond is currently employed by 
Science Applications International Corporation as Director, Program 
Development.  Immediately prior to his current position, he was International 
Sales Manager for Oshkosh Truck Corporation, a position he held for two years. 
[Ref. 17] 
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With regard to the Marine Corps’ transition of the MTVR Program to 
MCB Quantico, Mr. Raymond felt that the decision had been made at a very high 
level within the Marine Corps and the MTVR move simply supported their new 
strategy for acquisition.  It was just a matter of executing the transition. He stated 
that, as the Product Manager for the MTVR Product Office, he and a senior team 
of PEO-GCSS Officials had visited MCB Quantico in the Fall of 1999 to brief Mr. 
Lawrence P. Kreitzer, Executive Director, Marine Corps Systems Command.  
The purpose of the briefing was to convince the Marine Corps to delay the 
transition of the MTVR program for at least another year beyond the Milestone III 
decision, and longer if possible.  This would have pushed the transition back to 
June 2002 at the earliest. [Ref. 17] 
Mr. Raymond felt that the Marine Corps representatives listened 
respectfully to the Army’s briefing, but that they had already made up their mind 
as to the date of the transition and were committed to making it a reality. The 
briefing pointed out the fact that transitioning the program shortly after Milestone 
III was not the best time to do it.  Typically with truck programs, once Milestone III 
is approved, the PMO suffers about a year of turbulence as equipment 
deficiencies are corrected and fielding is initiated.  This period requires a great 
deal of the Project Office’s time and skillful handling to make required 
adjustments. He felt that the program suffered delays by transitioning so soon 
after Milestone III. 
The transition itself was quite a challenge for the Product Manager.  
Coming in as the new PM for MTVR, Mr. Raymond had been faced with the 
challenges of executing the program, knowing that it was being transitioned to 
the Marine Corps.  He had to try to convince the Marines to delay the transition 
and, at the same time, keep up the morale of his personnel so that they could 
properly execute their programs. He viewed his leadership role to include 
keeping his employees informed; letting them know that he and the Army were 
actively trying to keep the MTVR program at TACOM; having regular two-way  
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communications with his staff; and letting them know that he was actively 
working to help them secure new positions if and when the program transitioned. 
[Ref. 17] 
Mr. Raymond felt that the Marines were not fully prepared for the 
transition.  The Marine Corps was not used to managing and executing on its 
own such a large and complex program.  The Corps had depended on the other 
DoD services, especially the U.S. Army, to take the lead in its acquisition 
programs.  However, he felt that the transition itself was professionally executed 
due to the commitment of all the involved parties to keep the program going. 
Mr. Raymond considered it a privilege to have been a PM in a 
multi-service Product Office.  It had been a unique experience that offered new 
challenges, and it provided insight into the operations of additional DoD services, 
which, for the MTVR included not only the Marine Corps, but also the Navy.  He 
characterized the experience as “professionally, a rewarding experience.” 
Mr. Raymond stated that, prior to the transition, the working 
relationship among the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps, and OTC had been 
excellent and an example of “true partnering” in a DoD acquisition. The MTVR 
was a model acquisition program.  However, after the transition of the program to 
the Marines and the placement of new Marine Corps contracting personnel and 
support staff, the work environment deteriorated.  OTC felt the `transition of the 
program from the U.S. Army to the Marine Corps was “rough.”  Raymond felt that 
the work environment never regained its past success. [Ref. 17]   
2. Collective Viewpoint of Army Personnel 
The Army community at TACOM clearly believed that keeping the MTVR 
Product Office at TACOM was the best option. Under the PEO-GCSS vision 
statement, the Marine Corps was provided a flexible and integrated organization 
of highly trained and motivated military and civilian acquisition experts committed 
to ensuring that the soldier [or in the case of MTVR, “the Marine”] was equipped 
with the world’s finest Ground Combat and Support Systems.  The PEO and 
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TACOM had the required personnel with the experience to execute the program 
fully.  The Army had been successfully executing the Marine Corps’ Light 
Armored Vehicle and Logistics Vehicle System Programs at TACOM for many 
years. The Product Office was highly regarded and recognized by DoD and had 
received several awards, including the David Packard Award for best defense 
acquisition processes.  Feedback obtained from my questionnaire and several 
interviews that I conducted with U.S. Army MTVR Product Office personnel 
clearly showed the Army’s satisfaction with the experience it had gained from 
managing the MTVR program.  The MTVR Program provided an opportunity for 
TACOM-based U.S. Army personnel to continue to work in a truck-related 
program after terminating their Army truck program.  In other words, PEO-GCSS 
was able to keep its Product Office employees employed.  This provided new 
opportunities to gain valuable experience by working on a new truck program for 
the Marines. In interviews, the former Army Product Managers clearly stated that 
the MTVR Program was a valuable experience for both the Marines and the 
Army.  The Marine Corps gained by utilizing a Product Office that had abundant 
talent and experience in truck acquisition programs.  The MTVR program was 
able to leverage the critical truck knowledge base that existed at TACOM.  The 
Marines were able to jump into an existing Product Office and keep an Army 
Product Office operating even after the Army had terminated their program. 
The question asked on my questionnaire “Do you feel that the Army 
provided the “best value, best alternative” at the start of the MTVR Program until 
the Marine Corps could provide its own MTVR Product Office?”  The answer was 
a unanimous yes. All felt that the Army provided outstanding support for the 
MTVR Program. [Ref. 27] 
D. OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION PERSPECTIVE 
1.  Mr. Steve Zinke, MTVR Program Director Interview at OTC 
I attended the MTVR IPR at Oshkosh Truck Corporation (OTC) on 23-25 
October 2000 and interviewed the MTVR Program Director for OTC, Mr. Steve 
Zinke.  Mr. Zinke’s background is in engineering.  He had been working on the 
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MTVR Program since 1996 and was OTC’s MTVR Program Director.  In 
comparing the MTVR Program with other Army Programs that he had worked on 
during his 20 years at OTC, Zinke said that he and OTC were committed to 
making this program work.  Unlike other Army programs where the contractor 
had just the Army to contend with, the MTVR Program had the Army and the 
Marines. All three principal groups—OTC, Army, and the Marines—had to work 
in concert to make this program successful. Through the use of partnering, each 
had to be committed to the others in the sharing of ideas, test results, plans, and 
other aspects.  OTC would go the extra mile in order to make this happen. As an 
example, the Oshkosh, when faced with a contractual Engineering Change 
Proposal (ECP), “through the goodness of their heart,” had made the required 
changes without additional cost to the Government. [Ref. 33] 
OTC was aware that, even though the contractual relationship existed 
between OTC and the Army at TACOM, the ultimate customer was the Marines. 
The Marines Corps was to eventually take over the program and take delivery of 
the finished product. The transition program that was being planned between the 
Army and the Marines was something new and unique for OTC.  Zinke 
considered it an education process for OTC.  
Zinke commented on the Marine Corps’ approach to the program.  He felt 
that TACOM and the PEO had a more methodical approach to solving problems, 
while the Marines exhibited a more “roll up your sleeves and let’s get the job 
done” approach.  He also felt that the Marines were thin in terms of personnel 
directly working on the program.  [Ref. 33] 
2. Summary of Interviews 
In interviews conducted with U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and OTC officials 
involved in the MTVR program, the unifying word used by all three groups was 
“partnering.”  Everybody involved with the MTVR Project Office worked together 
as a team to make the MTVR a reality.  Everyone wanted this to be the best truck 
possible, to do everything that needed to be done, and do it at the least possible 
cost. 
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This recurring theme was clearly shown in all the interviews that I had 
conducted, and also reflected in the responses to my questionnaire, below.  
Naturally, the Program encountered some problems, as one would expect in a 
new truck program.  What wasn’t expected, however, was how well all the team 
players worked together to resolve these problems. As one program member 
commented, Oshkosh Truck took the idea of true “partnering” to “the max.” OTC 
made an honest attempt to accommodate both the Army and Marine Corps in 
producing the MTVR Truck and, through the use of “partnering,” made it a reality.  
E. PROGRAM TRANSITION QUESTIONNAIRE 
In order to obtain a wider database of information regarding the MTVR 
Program, especially its transition from the U.S. Army to the Marine Corps, I 
prepared a formal questionnaire that asked a variety of questions pertaining to 
the MTVR Program.  Questions were arranged in several groups, including: 
transitioning the MTVR Program from the Army to the Marine Corps; Marine 
Corps’ impression of the MTVR; Marine Corps’ impression of the U.S. Army’s 
Product Office; Marine Corps’ impression of Oshkosh Truck Corporation; Marine 
Corps acquisition center at Hospital Point.  Each category contained several 
questions, and participants answered a total of 27 questions. All participants 
were asked the same questions, even those that might not apply to them. [Ref. 
27] (see Appendix K for the complete questionnaire). 
I attempted to contact both current and past members of the MTVR 
Product Office.  I was interested in the opinions of those who worked originally in 
the Army-managed MTVR Product Office, as well as those that were or currently 
are working in the Marine Corps-managed MTVR Product Office.  It would have 
been interesting to question individuals who had transitioned with the program 
from TACOM to MCB Quantico to gain their impressions of working at both 




In May 2004, I emailed the questionnaire to more than 30 Army and 
Marine Corps MTVR Product Office participants and received 20-plus responses.  
In a few cases, I followed up the responses with phone interviews in order to 
clarify some responses and obtain additional program information.    
The individuals that I contacted at the Marine Corps included Mr. Paul 
Neubert, Medium Fleet Team Leader of PM Motor Transport.  He has been 
involved with the MTVR Program since its inception in the 1990s, actively 
attending IPRs when the Product Office was still located at TACOM.  He has 
worked on the program continuously since the transition to the Marine Corps 
MCB Quantico. [Ref. 27] 
The additional Marine Corps MTVR Product Office personnel who were 
contacted, and who responded, included Major Mike Loos (Ret.), who served as 
the USMC liaison officer in the MTVR Product Office at TACOM and who 
remained with the program until he retired from the active military when the 
program transitioned to MCB Quantico.  Two additional people who currently 
work in logistics and engineering at MCB Quantico for the MTVR program also 
responded. 
On the U.S. Army side, I contacted and received responses from the 
former MTVR Product Managers, along with those working in logistics and 
engineering on the program. The questionnaire responses supplemented the 
detailed interviews with two of the former U.S. Army product managers for the 
MTVR program while it was at TACOM.   
Below are a series of key questions from the questionnaire and a digest of 
the responses. 
Question: “What was your impression of the collaboration that the Marine 
Corps conducted for the MTVR Transition?” One Marine responded: “It was just 
used to validate the transition of the program—it was already a done deal.”  
Additional Marine Corps respondents felt that it was a professional tool to 
determine the validity of any planned transition; however, another Marine Corps 
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respondent stated that it “was a waste of time since the recommendations were 
ignored.” The Army respondents were concerned with the collaborative process 
itself and not surprised with the actual results, which indicted that leaving the 
MTVR program at TACOM was the first, best choice.  Most felt that the decision 
had already been made at higher levels and the collaboration was an attempt to 
justify that decision. [Ref. 27]  
Question: “What was your feeling about transitioning the program at that 
point in time [June, 2001]?” This was just a few months after obtaining Milestone 
III approval for the MTVR program.  Responses varied, from stating that the 
program should not have transitioned at all from the Army, to stating that it was 
the most appropriate time to make the transition.  However, just about all 
respondents stated that the Marine Corps had not been fully prepared for the 
transition.  Even the Team Leader for PM Motor Transport at MCB Quantico 
stated that the transition could have been better executed if they had had more 
personnel dedicated to the program at Quantico. [Ref. 27] 
Question: “Did you feel that the Marine Corps was ready at that point in 
the program for the transition?”  The Marine responses varied from a short and to 
the point “yes” to “at the time of the transition it seemed that the Marine Corps 
team was not complete.  This was due to slow hiring actions for permanent 
employees.  Unlike the Army (TACOM), the Marines did not have a matrix of 
employees from which to quickly fill positions.”  The Army responses were 
consistent in that they felt the Marine Corps was not ready to transition the 
program, noting that the Marines simply did not have the support staff in place to 
take on the MTVR program at that particular time. [Ref. 27] 
One Marine Corps respondent stated on the questionnaire: 
[T]he transition seemed to have happened too soon.  I felt our PM 
was fully accepting of the transition and believed it was definitely 
the best route to take; initially, this action did leave the remaining 
Marine Corps team members in a very stressful (overworked)  
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environment.  Manpower actions were slow in coming, turnover 
was basically non-existent, so all newcomers had to do just what 
they could do until a nitch could be created for them. [Ref. 27] 
Question: “Do you feel that the Army provided the best value, best 
alternative at the start of the MTVR Program until the Marine Corps could provide 
its own MTVR Product Office?”  The respondents felt unanimously that the U.S. 
Army did an outstanding job in executing the MTVR program.  This was fully 
supported by both Army and Marine Corps respondents.  One Marine responded 
that, “The Army had all the corporate knowledge for military truck programs.  
There was no alternative.” [Ref. 27] 
Question: “What has been the Marine Corp’s overall impression of the 
MTVR truck?” All respondents, both Marine Corps and the U.S. Army, responded 
that the truck was outstanding. It had done everything that it was supposed to do.  
The Marines had received “best value” for their program dollars. One Marine 
Corps respondent stated that, “Overall, the perception is that the truck is a new 
awesome capability.” [Ref. 27] 
Question: “What had been the overall Marine Corps impression of 
Oshkosh Truck Corporation?”  The Marine Corps responded with favorable 
comments, stating that “they are a professional organization and have built a 
good truck” for the Marines.  Another response was: “The Marine Corps 
understands that OTC is a business that makes business decisions.  In general, 
they have been responsive for technical and logistics issues but tend to be slow 
with contract negotiations.”  The U.S. Army respondents indicated that they were 
quite favorably impressed with OTC and that OTC displayed a true sense of 
partnering. [Ref. 27] 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter III provided background on the joint DoD Program Office for the 
Marine Corps MTVR Program, including the collaboration that the Marine Corps 
prepared for the transition of the MTVR Program Office from the Army at TACOM 
to the Marine Corps at Quantico.  It provided insights from several interviews with 
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both Marine Corps and U.S. Army officials of the MTVR Project Office.  It also 
provided insight from a key contractor manager.  The chapter also offered 
additional insights from a detailed MTVR Program Transition Questionnaire that 
was sent to both the Marine Corps and Army personnel, asking program-related 
questions.   
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The primary research question was: What impact did Army management 
of the MTVR Program have on the Marine Corps future acquisition methodology? 
The Marine Corps’ strategy for acquisition of military systems changed in 
the late 1990s from buying their acquisition support from the other DoD services 
to standing up their own acquisition center-of-excellence. Taking over the 
“hands-on” management of MTVR acquisition was not due to unhappiness with 
the Army’s acquisition support.  The move was a logical outcome of the USMC’s 
pursuit of a larger strategy to stand up a uniquely Marine Corps acquisition 
capability. 
1. Subsidiary Research Questions  
• Was the transition of the MTVR program from the Army to the 
Marine Corps adequately studied and planned? 
The Marine Corps examined various alternatives to the possible relocation 
of the Program Office for the MTVR. A collaborative meeting was conducted on 
27 May 1999, which evaluated seven possible options. Those ranged from 
leaving the current program office in place at TACOM to moving it immediately to 
Quantico, Virginia. Various factors were considered in examining the seven 
possible alternatives, with appropriate scores being assigned to the seven 
alternatives. Weighted means and averages were used which eventually led to 
the order ranking of the alternatives. 
The Marine Corps conducted an orderly study to evaluate the feasibility 
and impacts of moving the MTVR from Army management in Warren, MI to the 
USMC center of acquisition excellence at Quantico, VA in support of its new 
acquisition strategy.  Marine and Army acquisition managers set up a team 
structure to oversee, plan, and execute the move of MTVR acquisition 
management from Warren, MI to Quantico, VA with all the required associated 
details.  
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• How did the decision to transition the MTVR Program from the U.S. 
Army to the Marine Corps impact the program? 
Based on the Marine Corps strategy for acquisition and the MTVR study, 
the Marines decided that the proposed move of the MTVR Product Office did not 
present a major risk to the MTVR fielding schedule. The move of MTVR 
management was accomplished with only minor impact to the program’s 
schedule, even though there were difficulties along the way.  The MTVR 
production contracts transitioned on 31 May and 6 June 2001.  MTVR 
management transitioned to the Marine Corps at Quantico from the Army at 
TACOM on 30 June 2001 and the Army product office in Warren, MI that had 
managed the MTVR program stood down.  
• What impact will the establishment of the Marine Corps new 
acquisition center at Quantico have on future joint or multi-service 
acquisitions? 
The Marine Corps action to stand up their own center of acquisition 
excellence at Quantico, VA may create barriers to future joint or multi-service 
acquisitions.  The manner in which this reorganization of acquisition will interface 
with JCIDS and precisely the way it will affect relationships with defense 
contractors is still unknown. 
B.  THESIS CONCLUSION 
The MTVR is a unique Army/Marine Corps ACAT II program. The overall 
program goal was to obtain a cost-effective, state-of-the-art vehicle to replace the 
Marine Corps’ Medium Tactical Truck.  The Product Office was a result of a 
Congressional directive that required the “harmonization” of the truck acquisition 
programs of both the Army and the Marine Corps.  This was accomplished by a 
rather distinctive multi-service Product Office administered by both the Army, and 
the Marine Corps.  Despite the obvious impediments that this arrangement could 
have encountered, the professional staff and outstanding support and dedication 
that each service has offered ensured that the MTVR Program met its primary 
objective of providing the best possible truck to the Marine Corps. The MTVR 
Program Management Team, made up of the Army, the Marine Corps, and 
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Oshkosh Truck Corporation, excelled in developing and manufacturing a state-of-
the-art 21st- Century truck.  In support of the USMC strategy for standing up its 
own center of acquisition excellence, the MTVR transitioned following the April 
2001 Milestone III Decision.  The Army and Marine Corps accomplished this 
action cooperatively in accordance with the published transition plan. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Managing multi-service programs is a huge and challenging undertaking 
for professionals in the acquisition field.  Effective multi-service program 
management necessitates the understanding of each service’s missions and 
operational needs, as well as the differences in their acquisition approaches.  
Amalgamating the system acquisition needs of two or more military services 
under the charter of a multi-service program office and successfully delivering the 
full system capability on time and within the budget requires exceptional 
managerial skills. 
The lessons learned by the Marine Corps should be carefully recorded to 
support future shifts of other Marine Corps programs to the Marine Corps center 
of acquisition excellence.   
Thought should be given to the design of pre-acquisition and acquisition 
organizational structures for multi-service or joint ground mobility systems, 
consistent with the addition of the Marine Corps center of acquisition excellence.  
New teaming arrangements will need to involve the new player.  Obviously, older 
formats are no longer applicable. 
The Future Combat System (FCS) may serve as a useful vehicle to study 
the effects of the new center-of-excellence on partnering for multi-service 
acquisition. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Although most individuals and organizations contacted by the author 
either by phone and email responded reasonably well, a site visit to MCB 
Quantico to interview current PM MTVR Product Office officials would have 
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helped immensely.  My repeated requests for a visit, and even for some phone 
interviews, were declined.  This was due, in part, to the Marine Corps’ 
involvement in the War in Iraq.  Updated program data would have been 
interesting and informative to add to my thesis.  However, I was limited to what 
was made available to me in the preparation of this thesis.   
Also, the MTVR is a relatively new truck.  It is currently in production and 
many are just being fielded.  Despite an exhaustive search, there was not an 
abundant source of printed articles and materials that analyzed the MTVR Truck.  
Much of the information that I was able to obtain was through program briefings 
as well as questionnaires and personal interviews with program officials.  
 69
APPENDIX A. HISTORY OF TACOM 
TACOM traces its beginnings to the buildup for U.S. involvement in World 
War II. The Detroit Tank Arsenal began on 15 August 1940, when Chrysler 
Corporation and the U.S. Army signed a contract to build a $20 million plant and 
fill an initial order of one thousand tanks at $33,500 apiece. 
Chrysler promised to roll the first tank off the production line in twelve 
months, but it took even less time than that. The first tank appeared on 24 April 
1941. During the World War II years, that production line would generate another 
25,058 tanks. 
Tank-automotive management moved to Detroit shortly after the tank plant 
was built. Before World War II, two technical services had managed the Army's 
tank-automotive items: Ordnance managed tracked and Ordnance-unique 
vehicles, while Quartermaster controlled wheeled vehicles. In order to meet 
World War II's increasing demands, the Army consolidated the tasks of 
tank-automotive management development, procurement, and maintenance 
under the control of the Office, Chief of Ordnance (OCO).In September 1942, 
Ordnance established the Tank-Automotive Center (T-AC) in Detroit. Because 
T-AC replicated the structure of the OCO in Washington, the Army redesigned it 
as the Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit (OCO-D), on 1 January 1944. 
During the post-war demobilization, the Army dismantled OCO-D on 20 
March 1946 and transferred its personnel and functions to the Detroit Tank 
Arsenal facilities. However, the Arsenal's peacetime missions pilot tank 
development and rebuild programs expanded again when war broke out in 
Korea. Consequently, a newly-formed Ordnance Tank-Automotive Center 
(OTAC), replicating the earlier OCO-D, began operations at the Detroit Arsenal 
on 24 October 1950. The Army elevated OTAC to command level on 1 May 
1954, a status it retained until the Army reorganization of 1962. 
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In order to rationalize management of the logistics system, the Army 
created the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) in May 1962. The Army 
established seven major subordinate commands under AMC control, and 
together they assumed many of the research, development, and supply tasks 
performed by the Ordnance Corps and the other Technical Services. As a 
consequence of this reorganization, OTAC's functions were reduced. The 
newly-created U.S. Army Weapons Command (WECOM) in Rock Island, Illinois, 
took control of the combat vehicle program. At the same time OTAC, now 
renamed the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Center (ATAC), came under the control 
of another new command, the U.S. Army Mobility Command (MOCOM), 
established in Detroit in December 1962. MOCOM had responsibility for a variety 
of unrelated equipment: locomotives and rolling stock, fixed-wing and rotary 
aircraft, and general purpose and tactical vehicles. 
In January 1967, the Army dissolved MOCOM; one month later, ATAC 
was elevated to a major subordinate command, with the new title “U.S. Army 
Tank-Automotive Command” (TACOM). With this new status, TACOM gradually 
acquired control over other tank-automotive systems. Later that month, WECOM 
transferred the armored personnel carrier mission to TACOM. In June 1972, 
TACOM assumed from WECOM the responsibility for the tank management 
program. One exception was management of the Abrams tank, which, similar to 
the Bradley fighting vehicle system, was under AMC project management during 
the development and initial production phase. (WECOM'S successor, the U.S. 
Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, retained overall 
responsibility for self-propelled artillery systems until TACOM took operational 
control of these functions on 1 July 1994.) 
In January 1976, the Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee 
(AMARC) initiated some significant changes in commodity command structure. 
AMARC hoped to elevate the status of research and development (R&D) by 
creating distinct R&D commands. On 1 July 1976, TACOM's R&D division 
became the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research and Development Command 
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(TARADCOM) and the rest of TACOM became the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive 
Materiel Readiness Command (TARCOM). AMARC redesigned AMC the U.S. 
Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) in order to 
highlight these dual functions of commodity management. During the next four 
years, TARADCOM strove to improve tank-automotive research and 
development activities, while TARCOM directed its attention to support of fielded 
systems. 
By 1980, both commands faced manpower shortages, and on 1 October 
1980, the two commands were reunited as TACOM. Less than three years later, 
on 17 June 1983, TACOM's responsibilities expanded when DARCOM 
transferred the Abrams tank series and Bradley fighting vehicle system to 
TACOM program managership. By incorporating these technologically advanced 
systems under its command flag, TACOM became the one central point for all of 
the Army's tank-automotive activities, a focus unaltered when DARCOM reverted 
to its AMC designation on 1 August 1984. 
For a few years, TACOM's missions and organization structure remained 
relatively stable. However, another period of change commenced in 1987. 
Specifically, Army-wide implementation of the Program Executive Officer (PEO) 
concept resulted in TACOM's transferring research, development, and acquisition 
management responsibilities for many major systems to two tenant organizations 
provisionally formed on 1 May 1987. The Bradley fighting vehicle system, the 
high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle, and the Abrams tank series are a 
few of the systems controlled by the PEOs. Under the PEO arrangement, 
TACOM provided technical and functional support for those systems assigned to 
the two PEOs. In 1989, DA directed that the PEOs transfer back to TACOM 
several systems, including the PMs for the M60 and M113 family of vehicles, the 




In the early 1990s, the two PEOs collocated at TACOM underwent 
changes affecting acquisition and mission. On 11 January 1990, DA 
implemented Management Review recommendations pertaining to financial 
management. As a result, a streamlined acquisition process for major systems 
allowed a direct flow of funding from DA through the PEOs to the Program 
Managers. TACOM continued to provide support services to the PEOs, whose 
staff remained small and dependent upon the command. In addition, the PEO for 
Heavy Force Modernization became renamed the PEO for Armored Systems 
Modernization. The name change more appropriately reflected that organization's 
mission to upgrade both the light and heavy armored systems needed for a more 
mobile and deployable force. 
TACOM changed its structure slightly in late 1991, synthesizing major 
directorates around the business center concept. Major organizations undergoing 
structural or name changes included the Integrated Materiel Management Center 
(formerly Procurement and Readiness), the Acquisition Center (formerly the 
Directorate for Procurement and Production), the Comptroller (formerly the 
Directorate for Resource Management), and the Human Resources Center 
(formerly the Directorate for Civilian Personnel).  
FY 94 saw the realignment in place of the material management functions 
of the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), 
Rock Island, Illinois, with TACOM. This was directed in the 1993 Defense Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The BRAC report also directed that TACOM 
acquire the supply, bridging, counter mobility, water purification, and fuel and 
lubricant business areas of the U.S. Army Belvoir Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In addition to BRAC 
recommendations, AMC directed the in-place realignment of the U.S. Armament 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, 
New Jersey, from AMCCOM to TACOM. TACOM took operational control of 
these functions on 1 July 1994. 
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The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command was designated the U.S. 
Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) on 1 October 
1994.The new name coincided with TACOM's full assumption of command and 
control of missions gained from BRAC 93 recommendations and AMC direction. 
On 1 October 1998, TACOM took operational control of two depots: 
Anniston Army Depot and Red River Army Depot. Beginning on 1 October 1999, 
the command took take full command and control of these depots. [Ref. 2] 
A. TACOM TRUCK DEVELOPMENTS  
The Army is the largest owner of medium and heavy trucks with over 
250,000 vehicles within the Government.  The vast majority of these U.S. Army 
trucks have been developed, acquired, and maintained by some Product Office, 
at one time or another, at TACOM.  The Army spends approximately $2 billion 
per year operating and maintaining its truck fleet. Early on, DOD and DA realized 
that a national partnering initiative for trucks, focusing on increased fuel 
efficiency, safety, and affordability of medium and heavy truck, would greatly 
benefit both the military and the private sectors. [Ref. 13] 
On April 21, 2000, Vice President Al Gore, along with various Government 
officials and key industry partners, announced the formation of the 21st Century 
Truck Initiative. This initiative represents an extraordinary partnership between 
the U.S. Departments of Defense (DoD), Army (DA), Energy (DoE), and 
Transportation (DoT); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the U.S. 
Trucking industry. The purpose is to develop, demonstrate, and integrate 
commercially viable advanced technologies for the Nation’s military and 
commercial truck fleets in the 21st century. 
The National Automotive Center (NAC), located within the U.S. Army 
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command’s Tank Automotive Research, 
Development and Engineering Center (TACOM-TARDEC) fostered this initiative 
at the request of senior DoD and DA leadership. The initiative’s mission is to  
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improve fuel efficiency, increase safety, reduce ownership and operating costs, 
reduce emissions, and enhance the performance of military and commercial 
trucks. [Ref. 13] 
In order for the United States to remain in a position of economic and 
military superiority, the Nation must continue to improve the efficiency of all 
processes, including transportation services. With the advent of the 21st century, 
our Nation faces huge challenges in the areas of energy consumption, 
affordability, safety, performance, and environmental protection. The 
development of better-performing, more fuel-efficient, safer, more affordable, and 
cleaner vehicles is a formidable yet necessary goal for both military and 
commercial truck fleet owners and operators. 
Trucks are the critical lifeline for the movement of supplies and equipment, 
and their importance cannot be overstated. Army trucks are key to providing 
logistical support to those involved in any military operation. Fuel is by far the 
greatest logistical challenge, comprising 70 percent of the bulk tonnage shipped 
in support of military deployments. Trucks also represent a critical link in the 
Nation’s economy and are, therefore, a vital national resource. Nearly 85 percent 
of the U.S. commercial freight, by dollar value, is transported via truck, and data 
collected over the past 35 years indicate a direct correlation between the Nation’s 
economic performance and the efficiency of the trucking industry. In other words, 
the requirement for rapid and economic transportation of supplies remains critical 
for both the military and the Nation. 
Tasked by the Army, the NAC developed a 21st Century Truck Initiative 
Plan that was approved by Paul J. Hoeper, Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, in September 1998. The plan served as a 
catalyst for the national initiative. The NAC, established in 1992, is DoD’s and the 
Army’s focal point for partnering with industry to share costs in the development 
and demonstration of automotive and truck technologies. It is therefore, the 
logical choice to establish and play a central role in managing a partnership 
between the trucking industry and the Government. [Ref. 13] 
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One of NAC’s vehicles was unveiled on March 5, 2001, at the Society of 
Automotive Engineers International World Congress and Exhibition held in 
Detroit, MI. Called the “Smart,  Intelligent Systems,  Intelligent Vehicle” (Smar 
Truck) and looking like a James Bond futuristic vehicle, the Smar Truck 
capabilities include:- Headlights that will detect and disorient the enemy.- 
Electrified door handles to keep enemies at bay.- Ability to obscure the line of 
pursuers’ vision with a smoke screen.- Shoots pepper spray.- Protects occupants 
with bullet proof glass. The Smar Truck is a test bed for NAC and TACOM with 
the hopes that it will keep these organizations on the cutting edge of commercial 
and military technology. [Ref. 13] 
Both the Army and the Nation will benefit. As the Army transforms into a 
lighter, more mobile, more fuel-efficient force, the rapid integration of advanced 
commercially viable technologies into military trucks, such as the Marine Corps 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Truck, will be enhanced. 
Advancements in technologies such as hybrid-electric propulsion are an eagerly 
awaited result of the 21st-Century Truck Initiative. Advancements such as these 
are the foundation to improve combat effectiveness through enhancements in 
acceleration and stealth capability and reductions in fuel usage and stand-alone 
power-generation equipment. 
As efforts progress under the 21st-Century Truck Initiative, research and 
development will result in the integration of commercially viable advanced 
technologies into commercial trucks. In addition, the integration of more common 
components between Government and military fleets will result in reduced 
logistical burdens and economies of scale. DoD, DA, DoE, DoT, and the EPA will 
build on existing R&D investments. Through cooperative efforts, industry is 
expected to rapidly and continuously transition these R&D achievements into 
production vehicles. The 21st-Century Truck Initiative is geared to achieving the 
following ten-year research objectives:   
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• Improve fuel efficiency of heavy-duty trucks and buses. Significantly 
improve miles-per-gallon usage by the year 2010. 
• Reduce emissions. Exceed standards for oxides of nitrogen, 
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbons by the year 
2010. 
• Enhance safety. Meet or exceed the motor carrier safety goal of 
reducing fatalities by half within ten years. 
• Improve the crash friendliness of trucks for other road users. 
• Conduct operation road tests of truck safety improvement 
components. 
• Enhance affordability. 
• Maintain or enhance performance. 
Government and industry will coordinate R&D efforts and equally share 
costs for this ten-year initiative. Federal agencies will likely cover a larger portion 
of research expenses for work involving long-term, high-risk research, while 
industry funding will be greater for research likely to be converted relatively 
quickly to commercial products. The President’s budget in FY01 included $142 
million for truck research and related fact-finding, an increase of $46 million from 
FY00. It is anticipated that the initiative will expand future federal budgets for 
truck research from $96 million to approximately $250 million. Equal investments 
from industry and Government will address the full range of research areas 
associated with the trucking industry and its suppliers. These research areas are 
as follows:  
• Advanced propulsion technology, with a focus on advanced diesel-
engine, hybrid-electric, fuel-cell, and advanced drive train 
technologies. 
• Alternate fuels that are adaptable to the full range of propulsion 
sources, with a focus on clean burning. 
• Advanced materials such as high-strength steels, aluminum, 
magnesium, and composites, with a focus on their optimized use. 
• Vehicle intelligence, with a focus on advanced-communication and 
early warning technologies, vehicle diagnostics, and prognostics. 
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• Advancement in vehicle designs to reduce aerodynamics drag, with 
a focus also on reducing other forms of parasitic losses like rolling 
resistance. 
• Safety, with a focus on the driver environment, driver hardware and 
hardware environment areas.  
Emission reductions, to include exhaust gas recirculation, selective 
catalytic reduction, particulate matter catalytic reduction, particulate matter 
catalytic soot filters, oxidation catalyst, Nox absorber/catalyst, homogeneous 
charge compression ignition combustion, and fuel cell/hybrid power trains. 
A Partnership Coordinating Committee has been formed and is 
responsible for coordinating the execution of the initiative. The committee 
includes senior representatives from industry, DoD, DA, DoE, DoT, EPA, the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on Environmental Quality, 
the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, and the Office of 
Management and Budget. 
With the assistance of the academic community, the Partnership 
Coordinating Committee will direct the development of both the initiative’s overall 
research plan and associated technology roadmaps. The research plan and 
technology roadmaps are required to determine the appropriate level of 
investment in advanced technologies to meet the initiative’s aggressive research 
objectives. Successful technology road mapping is very much dependent on an 
awareness of current research and technology programs, an understanding of 
the limitations of current research and technology, the technical barriers that 
need to be overcome, and a vision of potential future technologies. 
Technology roadmaps will be continuously refined and will detail 
timetables for the ten-year span of this initiative. Throughout the duration of the 
initiative, close coordination will be maintained with the various managers of 
military trucks to ensure the rapid and cost-effective integration of advanced 
technologies into military trucks on an ongoing basis.  
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The Partnership Coordinating Committee will also coordinate and support 
the R&D teams organized around specific research objectives in order to achieve 
the program’s goals (such as technologies for improving power trains, reducing 
aerodynamics and rolling resistance losses, and reducing vehicle weight). Each 
team will include Government and industry partners and representatives from the 
academic community. 
The Partnership Coordinating Committee will also create an overall 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) for the 
partnership. The committee will develop guidelines that will facilitate the 
development and the use of CRADAs and other procurement mechanisms, such 
as other transaction agreements involving individual federal agencies and their 
laboratories. In addition, an external advisory board consisting of individuals with 
appropriate expertise from industry, academia, state and local Governments, and 
public interest groups will be established to develop peer review to assess 
technical and program progress. [Ref. 34]  
The 21st-Century Truck Initiative is the culmination of efforts by 
Government and industry to greatly benefit both the Nation’s military and civilian 
communities and to increase the Nation’s overall economic welfare. This initiative 
represents a key milestone for the Army, DoD  and TACOM in the quest to not 
only develop, but also to demonstrate advanced technologies that can be 
integrated into commercial and military trucks such as the MTVR. It will assist the 
military immensely in achieving a lighter and more fuel-efficient mobile force. 
[Ref. 13] 
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APPENDIX B. HISTORY OF OSHKOSH TRUCK COMPANY 
In the early 1900s, shade-tree mechanics all over the United States 
tinkered in barns and sheds with the idea that a vehicle could run on its own 
power.  They dreamed of a vehicle that would go where the usual forms of 
mechanized transport—trains and boats—could not go. It would run wherever it 
was pointed. 
For several years, a vehicle capable of going almost anywhere remained a 
dream because early roads were a nightmare.  Created from dirt and gravel, with 
no thought given to drainage, early 20th-century roads in the United States 
evolved from the paths of Native Americans and from pioneer wagon tracks.  In 
warm weather they were dusty, dirty, and unreliable, and at other times they 
were either snow-covered or immersed in mud, slush, or standing water.  As a 
result, American productivity declined each year with cold or wet weather and 
spiraled upward again in late spring. 
This problem was attacked from two unique angles.  The first concrete 
street in North America was laid down in Bellefontaine, Ohio in 1891.  Concrete 
and asphalt eventually found favor and spread. 
A second development occurred in Clintonville, Wisconsin.  The 
Wisconsin Duplex Auto Company was organized to develop and produce a four-
wheel-drive vehicle.  Like paved roads, the vehicle was a gradual but resounding 
success, improving productivity and helping tame what was still a raw and 
rugged country. 
The founders of Oshkosh Truck, W.R. Besserdich and B.A. Mosling, 
looked at transportation problems in different ways. Besserdich, the mechanic, 
believed that power to all four wheels was the answer to the problem of traveling 
over the awful roads, whereas Mosling, the merchant, realized that once roads 
were developed, a new, nationwide era in transportation and productivity would 
evolve. 
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Making productive transportation equipment that goes on and off the road 
has been the Oshkosh Truck Corporation’s hallmark throughout its history.  From 
the first prototype (a four-wheel-drive truck named “Old Betsy”) to the current ten-
wheel-drive military vehicles that provide the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps 
with superior mobility and efficiency, the company has filled a distinctive niche in 
the story of American Transportation.   
Oshkosh Truck Corporation was incorporated on 1 May 1917, as the 
Wisconsin Duplex Auto Company.  The first production truck was the Oshkosh 
Model A, which featured a door on each side of the cab.  Most trucks with cabs in 
those days required entry from the passenger’s side because the steering wheel 
blocked entry from the driver’s side.  Their four-wheeled truck produced 72 
horsepower (hp), largely due to the fact that the Herschel-Spillman four-cylinder 
engine heated the fuel at three different points to get the most from the low-
octane gasoline of the time.  The Brown-Lipe Model 35 transmission featured 
four forward speeds and a reverse.  The truck frame was fabricated by A.O. 
Smith Company. 
Early Oshkosh Trucks were fully suspended and seldom got stuck.  Under 
rugged conditions, drivers reported being able to average an amazing “14 to 20 
miles an hour” traveling between Oshkosh and Milwaukee because of the truck’s 
all-wheel drive capability. 
Oshkosh Truck Corporation’s entry into the U.S. Military was a far cry from 
the large, complex vehicles that they produce today for the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps.  It began in 1939, with the W-Series—trucks used primarily as 
snowplows and dump body vehicles.   
The first W-Series to see military duty during World War II was the Model 
W-700, chosen by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  The Engineers employed 
rotary snow-blower equipment to keep Army Air Corps runways free of snow 
around the world, along with a number of trucks configured as wreckers.  The  
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rotaries were powered by a 175hp Climax engine mounted on the back of the 
truck.  Both the Climax and the six-cylinder, 112hp Hercules RXC truck engine 
powering the truck were gasoline-fueled. 
As early as 1960, the military was a major customer of the company and 
would continue to be a significant factor in the company’s growth and 
technological advancement for years to come.  The first major defense contract 
since World War II came as a result of the Cold War.  The United States knew 
that the Soviet Union was capable of launching a surprise air attack on North 
America.  In order to prevent such an attack, the United States and Canada 
strung a line of distant early warning (DEW) radar stations across Canada and 
Alaska.  This web of radar would alert the military, especially the U.S. Air Force. 
The Air Force had several Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the 
northern tier of states with B-36 and later, B-52, bombers poised to retaliate.  But 
since most bases were deep in the snow belt, the military needed a method to 
open runways immediately and to keep them open, no matter how much snow 
should fall.  Oshkosh Truck created a revolutionary new model. 
The WT-2206 Truck was the solution.  These large, heavy-duty trucks with 
325hp Hall-Scott engines and Allison TG 602-RM automatic transmissions were 
capable of operating at 55 miles per hour (mph) while plowing in formation, 
pushing snow in a wide, one-way arc past runway lights.  The high-speed truck 
was half the equation.  The other half involved a plow that was as innovative as it 
was simple. 
Before Oshkosh Truck addressed the challenge, snow removal vehicles 
moved down runways, then lifted their conventional blades and returned to their 
starting point so that all the snow could be pushed in the same direction.  But 
Oshkosh specified a big rollover plow that could be raised and rolled over.  The 
trucks could then simply turn around at the end of the runway and make another  
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pass, since all of the snow was now being pushed in the direction of the first 
pass.  Oshkosh won the contract to produce more than 1000 vehicles, which also 
could be equipped with rotary snowblowers. 
The WT-2206 also showed commercial airport management the benefits 
of high-speed snow removal.  Sales increased significantly as airport managers 
realized they could remain open during most storms, reducing disruption to 
airline schedules. 
In 1981, the company won its largest government contract to date.  
Oshkosh Truck was the successful bidder to construct Heavy Expanded Mobility 
Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), the trucks that proved crucial for ground support during 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander 
in Chief, U.S. Central Command during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 
told the House Armed Services Committee that, without trucks, “we never would 
have had the supplies far enough forward to go ahead and launch the war. . . . I 
am a great believer in the HEMTT.” More than 13,000 have been produced and 
delivered so far. [Ref. 35] 
Oshkosh Truck also supports the Marine Corps.  In addition to its MTVR 
truck program, since 1985, the Corps has taken delivery of 1,400 Logistics 
Support Vehicle Systems (LVS) trucks, which feature center articulation for 
increased mobility over soft and uneven terrain.  The vehicles have several 
different rear sections that can be uncoupled and interchanged.  Uncoupling also 
permits lifting by helicopter. [Ref. 35] 
In recent developments involving the MTVR truck program, Oshkosh 
Truck Corporation and Ohio State University have partnered to create TerraMax, 
a unique and completely autonomous MTVR. TerraMax has a complex sensing 
system and a global positioning sensor.  Six high-powered computers control the 
functions of driving and navigating.  The computers run on software developed 
by Ohio State University for map and route planning, obstacle detection and 
avoidance, sensor data input, and interpretation and diagnostics.  
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The MTVR drive-by-wire technology allows the computers to control 
steering.  An actuator operates the brakes, and acceleration is controlled 
electronically.  Sending systems—including a laser range finder, sonar, radar and 
digital video—allow TerraMax to “see” in order to avoid obstacles. [Ref. 36] 
A. OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION PERSPECTIVE 
Oshkosh Truck Corp. (OTC) engineers trucks for markets where unique, 
innovative designs outperform general purpose equipment in all types of terrain. 
OTC uses commercial engines, transmissions, axles, suspensions, tires, valves, 
pumps and many other components, but they also design and build them into 
severe-duty vehicles with capabilities much greater than commercial off-the-shelf 
vehicles. These commercial components have been developed, tested, and 
proven for an intended market and are then adapted for use in the unique or 
specialized applications. This can include a wide assortment of concrete mixers, 
snowplows, and tactical vehicles, such as the Palletized Load System (PLS), 
Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET), or Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 
(HEMTT). [Ref. 35] 
The Marine Corps’ MTVR Truck will be added to this impressive list of 
vehicles that OTC produces. The use of commercial components reduces 
development and production costs, and improves serviceability.  OTC was the 
first worldwide manufacturer of heavy-duty off- and on-road commercial and 
military trucks to be International Standards Organization (ISO)-9001 certified. 
OTC has operated under a certified ISO-9000 quality assurance program since 
May 1995. All personnel who manage, perform, and verify work affecting quality 
are responsible for implementing the quality system.  Four levels of 
documentation are utilized and maintained to meet the requirements of ISO-
9001. [Refs. 33, 35] These are: 
• Level 1: ISO Quality System Policies 
• Level 2: Quality System Procedures 
• Level 3: Work Instructions, Quality Control Procedures 
• Level 4: Records and Checklists 
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With the use of these four levels, a closed loop system is achieved that 
can be certified by a third party registrar. Oshkosh’s quality policy is focused on 
customer satisfaction: “To design, produce, deliver, and service quality vehicles 
and components.” 
ISO 9000 is a series of standards agreed upon by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and was adopted in 1987. More than 100 
countries now recognize the 9000 series for quality standards and certification for 
international trade. ISO 9000 evolved in Europe and in the European Common 
Market, and almost 50,000 companies have been certified as complying with 
these standards. Historians claim that ISO 9000 originated from the quality 
standards of the U.S. Department of Defense (MIL-Q9858) in the late 1950s. The 
British Standards Institution adopted these standards and expanded them to 
include the entire business process in 1979, calling them the “British Standard 
5750.” The International Organization for Standardization adopted the British 
Standard 5750 in 1987, calling it the ISO 9000 series. 
ISO consists of five primary parts numbered 9000 through 9004. This 
series ranges from design and development through procurement, production, 
installation, and servicing. While ISO 9000 and 9004 only establish guidelines for 
operation, ISO 9001, 9002 and 9003 are well-defined standards. The highest 
level of certification is 9001. There are 20 elements in the ISO 9000 standards 
that relate to how the system operates and how well it is performing. 
ISO 9000 is somewhat intentionally vague. A firm such as Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation interprets the requirements as they relate to its business. From a 
practical and useful standpoint for businesses, ISO 9000 is valuable to firms 
because it provides a framework so they can assess where they are and where 
they would like to be. In other words, ISO 9000 directs you to “document what 
you do and then do as you documented.” ISO is much more, in that it also 
promotes awareness and continuous improvement. 
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The International Organization for Standardization intended the 9000 
series to be more than a standard, reflecting a well-organized operation with 
trained, motivated people. It is proposed as the new challenge, with firms that 
move quickly enjoying the benefits of being a leader and those that delay losing 
business. There are three forms of ISO 9000 certification: 
• First party: A firm audits itself against ISO 9000 standards. 
• Second party: A customer audits its supplier. 
• Third party: a “qualified” national or international standards or 
certifying agency serves as an auditor. 
It is regarded by most that the best certification of a firm is through a third 
party. Once passed by the third-party audit, a firm is certified and may be 
registered and recorded by having achieved ISO 9000 status, and it becomes 
part of a registry of certified companies. Certification can take as little as three to 
six months, or as long as two years. Certification involves getting the proper 
documents, initiating the required procedures and practices, and conducting 
internal audits. This can then be followed by second or third party audits as 
required. 
The 20 elements to be addressed by a firm in an ISO 9000 Quality System 
are: 
• Management Responsibility 
• Quality System 
• Contract Review 
• Design Control 
• Document Control 
• Purchasing 
• Customer-Supplied Material 
• Product Identification and Trace ability 
• Process Control 
• Inspection and Testing 
• Inspection, Measuring, and Test Equipment 
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• Inspection and Test Status 
• Control of Nonconforming Product 
• Corrective Action 
• Handling, Storage, Packaging, and Delivery 
• Quality Records 
• Internal Quality Records 
• Training 
• Servicing 
• Statistical Techniques 
How does ISO 9000 relate to the Malcolm Baldrige Award? ISO is at the 
beginning of the quality evaluation. ISO 9000 provides stability in the system and 
minimum requirements for market survival. Once this is accomplished and in 
place, it is much easier to build to higher levels and obtain additional recognition 
and awards such as the Baldrige Award. 
Achieving certification will help a company to prepare for the Baldrige 
Award. Since 1992, applications for the Baldrige Award have dropped, and the 
Baldrige committee believes that this drop is caused by companies going for ISO 
9000 certification first. ISO focuses very closely on internal processes, especially 
manufacturing, sales, administration, and technical support and services. The 
Baldrige places more emphasis on customer satisfaction and business results. 
The Baldrige also assumes that you have your processes under control and, 
therefore, awards relatively few points in this area of consideration. On the other 
hand, the Baldrige addresses the issues of customer satisfaction, business 
results, and the competitive aspects of gaining increased sales and therefore 
profits. ISO 9000 virtually ignores competitive positioning. [Refs. 33, 35 
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APPENDIX C. HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS-QUANTICO 
It is called the “Crossroads of the Marine Corps,” and during its 80-year 
tenure on the approximately 100 acres located along the western bank of the 
Potomac River, Marine Corps Base Quantico has been a birthplace and training 
area for Marine Corps concepts. 
Prior to the Marines arriving here in 1917, the Town of Quantico owned 
the land.  At the turn of the 20th century, Quantico Land Company was formed on 
Quantico Creek.  The company, which promoted the town as a tourist attraction, 
offered such enticing inducements as refreshment stands, boats, and beaches 
with dressing rooms in order to help promote the tourist trade. 
By 1916, the Quantico Company began advertising Quantico as “The New 
Industrial City” and pushed for industry to come to the area.  At the same time, 
the Quantico Shipyards were established on the land that is now located by the 
Naval Medical Clinic, to build ocean freighters and tankers.  With growing 
tensions of war in Europe, the construction of U.S. Navy ships was a major 
moneymaker for the Quantico Shipyards. 
While the town of Quantico was rapidly growing as a fishing village, 
excursion center and shipbuilding center in early 1917, the town was not large or 
significant and was suffering many financial difficulties.  Around this time, then-
Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General George Barnett, 
sent a board to find possible sites for a new Marine Corps base in the 
Washington D.C. area. 
Aside from the expected requirements resulting from the impending threat 
of World War I and the resultant expansion of the Corps, many senior Marine 
Corps officers believed that the Corps needed an East Coast base just for the 
Advanced Base Force.  The force, a brigade of infantry plus artillery and service 
units, needed more space for quartering, training, and storage than the current 
site at Philadelphia Navy Yard could offer.  An area with suitable tactical terrain 
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for artillery and infantry maneuvers and that could be reached by rail and water 
was needed.  This requirement had been discussed by the Navy’s General Board 
years earlier, but no decision had been made.   
With these two important considerations—the needs of the Advanced 
Base Force and anticipated war requirements, compounded by Navy takeover of 
traditional Marine Training areas—Major General Barnett began searching for an 
East Coast base, emphasizing that he “did not want a base within the limits of an 
active navy yard,” as the industrial and other Navy requirements paramount there 
would probably crowd out the Marine Corps requirements. 
In 1917, Marine Barracks, Quantico was established with 91 enlisted men 
and four officers.  As technology grew and expanded, so did Quantico.  
Thousands of Marines were trained during World War I, and by 1920, the Marine 
Corps schools were founded, as then-Commandant Col. Smedley D. Butler put it, 
“to make this post and the whole Marine Corps a great university.”  These 
schools eventually developed into today’s Marine Corps University, where most 
Marine Corps Officers begin their careers and many enlisted types keep up with 
the primary military education. 
Quantico also has had other firsts, including a first in Marine aviation and 
warfare indoctrination.  The Marine Aircraft Wing was developed here, as well as 
the Corps’ first helicopter squadron, Marine Helicopter Squadron One.  HMX-1 
was the first helicopter squadron to provide rapid transportation of U.S. 
Presidents, which continues to this day. 
On 1 December 1947, the Marine Helicopter Squadron One was 
established.  Its mission was to test a new concept known as vertical 
envelopment.  The strange machines that would be tested were called 
helicopters, innovations, which would make the Marine Corps more versatile: get 
on and off the battlefields more quickly and safely; airlift casualties; cut down on 
re-supply missions; and move troops behind enemy lines. 
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Since 1947, the squadron has continued in its mission of “testing and 
evaluating military helicopters” with various aircraft and setting the standards in 
aviation excellence through its Operational Test and Evaluation department.  
More recently, the MV-22 Osprey was brought to Quantico for testing before 
being developed for use in the Fleet Marine Force.  However, the HMX-1’s  role 
has expanded and now includes not only testing, but also an even greater 
responsibility. 
In 1957, ten years after the HMX-1’s establishment, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower became the first U.S. President to use HMX-1 helicopter for quick 
transportation. Leaving his vacation grounds in Newport, Rhode Island on short 
notice, Eisenhower needed to fly to Naval Air Station Quonset Point to board Air 
Force One.  Spearheading the task, HMX-1 used one of its UH-34 Seahorse 
helicopters to fly the President to the air station.  Realizing the usefulness of the 
helicopter, Eisenhower continued to use the HMX-1 aircraft for the remainder of 
his term. 
More than 40 years since that first Presidential flight aboard an HMX-1 
helicopter, the squadron takes pride in continuing the mission of transporting the 
President in its various aircraft.  Today, the “First and Finest” Marine helicopter 
squadron in the Corps has grown to employ more than 700 personnel.  The 
squadron has four different aircraft: the CH-53E Super Stallion, the CH-46E Sea 
Knight, the VH-3D Sea King and the VH-60N Whitehawk. 
In 1987, the Marine Corps Development and Education Command at 
Quantico was changed to the “Marine Corps Combat Development Command,” 
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APPENDIX F. MTVR TRANSITION PLAN FROM U.S. ARMY, 
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APPENDIX G. MTVR PROGRAM TRANSITION BRIEFING TO 
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PM Motor Transportation 
Programs
Military Motorcycle (MILMO)Internally Transport Vehicle 
(ITV)
Medium Heavy Equipment 
Trailer (MHET)
Aviation Refueling Capability 
(ARC)
Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement Trailers
(MTVR-Trailer) 
Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacement (MTVR)
Interim Fast Attach Vehicle 
(IFAV)
High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle A2 
(HMMWVA2)
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Websites
Slide 1 - http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/hqmcmain.nsf/frontpage
Slide 2 – http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/HQMCMain.nsf/HQMC+Org+Chart?OpenPage
Slide 3 – http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/syscomorg/
Slide 4 – http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/syscomorg/gtespg.asp
Slide 5 - http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/GTES/PM%20MT/PM%20MT.asp
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APPENDIX K. MTRV PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE 
I. Transitioning the MTVR program from the U.S Army to the Marine Corps 
 
1. What was your feeling about transitioning the program at that point? 
 
2. What was your impression of the collaboratory that the Marine Corps 
conducted for       the MTVR Transition? 
 
3. Do you feel the Marine Corps was ready at that point in the program for the 
transition? 
 
4. By transitioning he program at that point in time, do you feel the program 
schedule may have been adversely impacted and if so, how so? 
 
5. Has the MTVR Program been on schedule since the transition of the program 
from the Army? 
 
6. What factors have caused any MTVR Program delays? 
 
II. Marine Corps Impressions of the MTVR 
 
1. What has been the Marine Corps overall impression of the MTVR Program? 
 
2. Now that the MTVR has been in the field for a couple of years, has the user 
suggested any modifications that could be incorporated for future trucks and 
upgrades? 
 
3. Are there any plans for additional MTVRs or MTVR variants? 
 
III. Marine Corps Impression of the Army’s Product Office 
 
 1. How satisfied was the Marine Corps with the Army’s handling of the Product 
Office for the MTVR during the early years of this program? 
 
 2. Were there any apparent deficiencies that the Marine Corps noted in the 
Army’s MTVR Product Office? 
 
 3. When the Army dropped out of the initial joint Army-Marine Corps MTVR 
Program, what was the impression of the Marine Corps, at that time, in having to 
go ahead alone with the MTVR Program? 
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 4. Do you feel the Army provided the “best value”, “best alternative” at the start of 
the MTVR Program until the Marine Corps could provide its own MTVR Product 
Office? 
 
 5. What was your impression of the relationship between the Army and the 
Marine Corps on the MTVR Program? 
 
 6. What was your overall impression of having a joint Army-Marine Corps 
Product Office? 
 
IV. Marine Corps Impression of Oshkosh Truck Corporation (OTC) 
 
 1. What has been the overall impression held by the Marine Corps of Oshkosh 
Truck Corporation? 
 
 2. Does the Marine Corps feel that they have received “best value” for their 
program dollars with Oshkosh Truck Corporation? 
 
 3. Has there been any serious thought given to go with another competing truck 
manufacturer for the MTVR? 
 
 4. What has been you OWN impression of dealings with OTC? 
 
 5. Your impression of their senior company and MTVR Product management?  
 
 6. Would you say that OTC has been open and attentive to concerns that you 
have raised over the years regarding the MTVR? 
 
 7. Have they been able to make positive impacts and creative suggestions to the 
Marine Corps and your OWN concerns with the MTVR truck during its 
production? 
 
V. Marine Corps Acquisition Center at Hospital Point, Quantico, Virginia 
 
 1. How successful has the creation of a Marine Corps acquisition center at 
Hospital Point been? 
 
 2. Do you personally think it has met its overall objectives? 
 
 3. By creating such a center, what do you think the impact has been on the 
MTVR Program? 
 
 4. Impact on additional Marine Corps acquisition program? 
 
 5. Any recent program developments at Hospital Point, Quantico, Virginia? 
 229
LIST OF REFERENCES  
1. Lara, Luis F., Analysis of the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
Contractor Logistics Support Contract, Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2001. 
2. Prentiss, D. and Bos, A., TACOM-Annual Command History, April 1998. 
3. LAV Mission Need Statement, 8 May 1981. 
4. Walters, Robert, Personal Interview, Deputy Program Manager-LAV 22 
November 2000. 
5. Mazurek, Dennis, Personal Interview, Deputy Program Manager-FMTV, 
December 2000. 
6. United States General Accounting Office GAO/NSID-99-26, Army Medium 
Trucks-Information on Delivery Delays and Corrosion Problems, January 
1999. 
7.  Handsy, Carl, Personal Interview, Senior Corrosion and Materials 
Engineer, TACOM, 17 February 2004. 
8. USMC, MTVR Mission Need Statement, 30 March 1992. 
9. USMC, MTVR Operational Requirements Document, 18 April 1994. 
10. USMC, MTVR Acquisition Strategy Report, 23 March 2001, 11 March 
1998. 
11. Neubert, Paul, Personal Interview, PM Motor Transport, USMC, 28 May 
04. 
12. Schoenig,P., Hamel, J., Engel, Rick, Garcia E., Jones, L., Luther, R., 
“Adopting Commercial Technology for Spiral  Modernization of Army 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles”, Army RD&A, 70- 99-3, 71-73, May-June, 
1999. 
13. Skalny, P., “21st Century Truck Initiative,” Army Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology, 70-00-5, 23-26, September-October 2000. 
14. Harrold, G. and Orsini, E., “Recapitalization: A Key Element of the Army 
Transformation,” Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, 70-01-1, 2-
4, January-February 2001. 
 230
15. USMC, MTVR Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), 22 September 
95. 
16. Wynbelt, Walter, Program Executive Officer, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, 
Memorandum MTTR to Commander, Combined Arms Support Command, 
Fort Lee, Virginia, November 1996.     
17. Raymond, Walter, LTC Personal Interviews, Product Manager-MTVR (July 
1999-June 2001) December 2000, 27 May 2004. 
18.  MTVR-Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, Marine Corps 
System Command and Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat and 
Support Systems, 15 May 1998. 
19. USMC, MTVR Transition Plan, 13 March 2000. 
20. Higgins, Rae, “MTVR Team Honored with DoD Acquisition Award”, 
TACOM Community Report, 21 June 2000. 
21. MTVR Systems Safety Management Plan, June 1999. 
22. MARCORSYSCOM web page, www.marcorsyscom.usmc, accessed May 
2004. 
23. Erwin, Sandra Army, “Marine Future Vehicle Programs Could Merge by 
’08,” National Defense, 586, 22-23 September 2003. 
24.  PM Force Projection, HSV Brochure, 2003. 
25. Ralston, D. and Gue, K., The Costs and Benefits of High Speed Vessels 
Relative to Traditional C-17 Military Airlift, Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2003. 
26. USMC, MTVR Collaboratory Decision Paper, 12 Jul y1999. 
27. MTVR Program Questionnaire, May 2004. 
28. Faulkner, Andrew, Personal Interview, MTVR Engineer, PM Motor 
Transport, USMC, 28 May 04. 
29. Joint Logistics Commanders’ Guide for the Management of Joint Service 
Programs, The Defense Systems Management College, 1987. 
30. Morton, Lee, MAJ, Personal Interview, Project Officer-MTVR, (December 
1999-October 2002), October 2000. 
31. Haag, Dennis, Personal Interview, USMC MTVR Liaison Officer, (June 
1993-August 1997), 28 May 04. 
 231
32. Schneller, George, LTC. Personal Interview, Product Manager-MTTR, 
(September 1996-July 1999) December 2000. 
33. Zinke, Steve, Personal Interview, Program Director-MTVR-Oshkosh Truck 
Corporation, 24 October 2000.       
34. United States General Accounting Office GAO/NSID-99-28, Army Medium 
Trucks-Acquisition Plans Need Safeguards, November 1998. 
35. Wright, David, Oshkosh Trucks-75 Years of Specialty Truck. 
36. “Tactical Truck Turned into Robot,” National Defense (Staff Writer) Vol. 
LXXXVIII, 605, 10, April 2004. 
37. Fleming, Charles A. LTC., Austin, Robin L. Captain, Braley, Charles A. 
Captain, Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, History and  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 233
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barr,B. and Ernest, H., “Operational Testing is About Soldiers,” Army RD&A, 77-
99-4, 15-17, July-August 1999. 
Batchelor, John and Macksey, Ken, A History of the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 
BCP Publishing, New York, New York, 1971. 
Bender, B., “Army May Resurrect Light Tank Programme,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 32(15), 8, October 1999. 
Bender, B., “USMC Joins Search for New Anti-Tank Missile,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 33(14), 81, 14 June 2000. 
Brown, S., “Remanufacturing vs. New Procurement,” Program Manager, 28 (6), 
2-5 November-December 1999. 
Brown, S., “Teaming Effort Delivers State-of-the-Art Truck to Marines,” Program 
Manager, 39 (2) 30-31, March-April 2000. 
Brownell, Tom, History of Mack Trucks, Motorbooks International, Osceola, 
Wisconsin, 1994. 
Cox, M., “Army Selects Wheeled, Speedy LAV as Interim Vehicle,” Defense 
News, 15(48), 36, 4 December 2000. 
Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) Report, Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), 25 July 1997. 
Drumheller, M., “Marines Welcome New Land-Water Craft,” National Defense, 
53(549), 59, July-August 1999. 
Dunston, Simon, Modern Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles, Airline 
Publishing Ltd., London, 2002. 
Erwin, Sandra Army, “Marine Future Vehicle Programs Could Merge by ’08,” 
National Defense, 586, 22-23, September 2003. 
Faulkner, Andrew, Personal Interview, MTVR Engineer, PM Motor Transport, 
USMC, 28 May 04. 
Fio, J., “From Warrior to Logistician,” Armor, 17-99-5, 23-25, August-September 
1999. 
 234
Fleming, Charles A. LTC., Austin, Robin L. Captain, Braley, Charles A. Captain, 
Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, History and Museums Div, 
Headquarters, U.S.M.C., Washington D.C., 1978. 
Foss, C., “Enhanced LAV-300,” Janes Defence Weekly, 32 (13), 38, 13 October 
1999. 
Georgana, G. N.  Trucks-An Illustrated History, Two Continents Publishing, N.Y., 
New York. 1978. 
Gourley, S., “U.S. Army Begins Armoured Vehicle Tests,” Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 33 (24), 5, 14 June 2000. 
Green, Michael, Tanks and AFV, Motorbooks International, Osceola, Wisconsin. 
1993. 
Gutleber, M., “Spiral Development: New Opportunities and Challenges,” Army 
RD&A, 77-99-4, 44-45, July-August 1999. 
Haag, Dennis, Personal Interview, USMC MTVR Liaison Officer, (June 1993-
August 1997), 28 May 04. 
Handsy, Carl, Personal Interview, Senior Corrosion and Materials Engineer, 
TACOM, 17 February 2004. 
Harrold, G.,Orsini, E., “Recapitalization: A Key Element of the Army 
Transformation,” Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, 70-01-1, 2-4, 
January-February 2001. 
Hewish, M., “US Marine Corps Shows its CLAWS as Proposals Are Sought,” 
Janes International Defense Review, 32, 8, November 1999. 
Higgins, Rae,”MTVR Team Honored with DoD Acquisition Award”, TACOM 
Community Report, 21 June 2000. 
Holmes, C., “Future Operational Capabilities,” Army Logistician, 700-99-4, 44-46, 
July-August 1999. 
Holzer, R., “U.S. Navy to Speed Innovative Systems to Marines,” Defense News, 
14(45), 40, 15 November 1999. 
Joint Logistics Commanders’ Guide for the Management of Joint Service 
Programs, The Defense Systems Management College, 1987. 
Killebrew, R., “Army Force Projection,” Armed Forces Journal, 137(2), 90, 
September 1999. 
 235
Lara, Luis F., Analysis of the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement Contractor 
Logistics Support Contract, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, December 2001.  
MARCORSYSCOM, Web Page, www.marcorsyscom.usmc, Accessed May 
2004. 
Mazurek, Dennis, Personal Interview, Deputy Program Manager-FMTV, (1996-
current), December 2000. 
Moran, J., Glasgow, W. “Production Leveling, Army Acquisition,” Logistics and 
Technology, 70(00-6), 42-43, November-December 2000. 
Morton, Lee, MAJ, Personal Interview, Project Officer-MTVR, (December 1999-
October 2002), October 2000. 
MTVR Acquisition Strategy Report, 23 March 2001, 11 March 1998. 
MTVR Collaboratory Decision Paper, 12 July 1999. 
MTVR Contract Transition Briefing, January, 2001. 
MTVR Mission Need Statement, 30 March 1992. 
MTVR Operational Requirements Document, 18 April 1994. 
MTVR Program Questionnaire, May 2004. 
MTVR Systems Safety Management Plan, June 1999. 
MTVR Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), 22 September 1995. 
MTVR Transition Plan, 13 March 2000. 
MTVR-Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, Marine Corps System 
Command and Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat and Support 
Systems, 15 May 1998. 
Neubert, Paul, Personal Interview, PM Motor Transport, USMC, 28 May 04. 
Ogorkiewicz, R., “ACV-IFV Heads Turkey's Armored Advance,” Jane’s 
International Defense Review, 32, 41-44, September 1999. 
Peniston, B., “U.S. Navy Procurement, Research Gain in Budget,” Defense 
News, 14(45), 46, November 15 1999. 
PM Force Projection, HSV Brochure, 2003. 
 236
Prentiss, D. and Bos, A., TACOM-Annual Command History, April 1998. 
Pugliese, D., “Canadian Bisons, Grizzlies to Get Upgrades,” Defense News, 
15(49),4, 11 December 2000. 
Ralston, D. and Gue, K. The Costs and Benefits of High Speed Vessels Relative 
to Traditional C-17 Military Airlift, Master’s Thesis Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, December 2003. 
Ramsey,N. and Lovekin, C.,  “A Systematic Approach to O&S Cost Reduction,” 
Army RD&A, 77 (99-4), 33-36, July-August 1999. 
Raymond, Walter, LTC Personal Interviews, Product Manager-MTVR (July 1999-
June 2001) December 2000, 27 May 2004. 
Sanders, P., “Simulation Based Acquisition: The  Revolution is Coming,” Army 
Research, Development and Acquisition, 70(99-3), 8-10, May-June 1999. 
Schneller, George, LTC. Personal Interview, Product Manager-MTTR, 
(September 1996-July 1999) December 2000. 
Schoenig,P., Hamel, J., Engel, Rick, Garcia E., Jones, L. and Luther, R., 
“Adopting Commercial Technology for Spiral  Modernization of Army Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicles,” Army RD&A, 70- 99-3, 71-73, May-June 1999. 
Seefers, G., “Shinseki Unveils All-Wheeled Vision for U.S. Army,” Defense News, 
14(42), 12, 25 October 1999. 
Skalny, P., “21st Century Truck Initiative,” Army Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology, 70-00-5, 23-26, September-October 2000. 
“Tactical Truck Turned into Robot,” National Defense (Staff Writer) Vol. LXXXVIII, 
605, 10, April 2004. 
Taylor, P., “New Ideas for Armor Company Maintenance Plans,” Armor, 17-99-5, 
44-46, September-October 1999. 
Tiboni, F., “IAV Win Generates Jobs, Revenue for Local Communities,” Defense 
News, 15(48), 6, 4 December 2000. 
U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Mission Need Statement, 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement NO MOB 211.4.2A, March 1992. 
United States General Accounting Office GAO/NSID-99-26, Army Medium 
Trucks-Information on Delivery Delays and Corrosion Problems, January 1999. 
 237
United States General Accounting Office GAO/NSID-99-28, Army Medium 
Trucks-Acquisition Plans Need Safeguards, November 1998. 
Walters, Robert, Personal Interview, Deputy Program Manager-LAV 22 
November 2000. 
Wilson, R., “High-Tech Corrosion Prevention,” Army RD&A, 70-99-3, 69-70, May-
June 1999. 
Wright, David, Oshkosh Trucks-75 Years of Specialty Truck Production, 
Motorbooks International, Osceola, Wisconsin, 1992. 
Wynbelt, Walter, Program Executive Officer, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
Memorandum, MTTR to Commander, Combined Arms Support Command, Fort 
Lee, Virginia, November 1996. 
Zinke, Steve, Personal Interview, Program Director-MTVR-Oshkosh Truck 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 239
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center  
 Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013  
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Brad R. Naegle  
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Mike Boudreau 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
5. Marine Corps Representative  
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
6. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC        
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
7. Director. Training and Education Command, MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
8. Richard Andrews 
 Westland, Michigan 
 
9. Jack Schramm 
 Warren, Michigan 
 
10. Ms. Roxy Wienand 
 Coopersville, Michigan 
 
11. U.S.A. TACOM 
 ATNN: AMSTA-CS-P/G5 (History) MS 432 
 Warren, Michigan 
 
12. Walt Raymond 
  SAIC 
 Sterling Heights, Michigan 
 
 240
13. Mr. & Mrs. James Devereaux 
 Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan 
 
14. Mr. Ken Homburg 
 Detroit, Michigan 
